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Kenneth has been the lead prosecutor in the trial section of the District 
Attorney’s Office for the past five years.1  He has been solicited by the 
                                                                                                                 
 * Prentice L. White is an Associate Professor of Law at Southern University Law 
Center (Baton Rouge, Louisiana), and is a former New Orleans prosecutor.  He is a member of 
the Louisiana Appellate Project, which is a state agency that handles criminal appeals for 
indigent defendants in Louisiana, and he is part of the CJA Panel of contract attorneys for the 
Middle and Western Districts of Louisiana.  The idea for this article resulted from several 
criminal appeals White has handled over the last ten years of his appellate practice and from 
conversations he has had with individuals who were wrongfully convicted for felony offenses. 
 1. The following account of Kenneth the prosecutor is fictional but representative of an 
all too common occurrence within our criminal justice system; see KENDALL HAVEN, STORY 
PROOF: THE SCIENCE BEHIND THE STARTLING POWER OF STORY 3 (Libs. Unlimited 2007) 
(claiming that stories go back 100,000 years in human history, even predating language); see 
also Kenneth D. Chestek, Judging by the Numbers:  An Empirical Study of the Power of Story,
7 J. ASS’N LEGAL WRITING DIRECTORS 1, 3 (2010) (demonstrating the persuasive power of 
storytelling because "stories are inherently interesting"). The author continues: 
We are entertained by stories.  Politicians and public speakers often use stories to 
make points and to teach, and often to persuade.  A good story affects the listener, or 
the reader, at a gut level.  When the audience reacts in the way the storyteller intends, 
the reader will ‘get’ the message internally in a way that is profound.   
Id.
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United States Attorney’s office on several occasions to head and train a new 
division in the federal prosecutor’s office regarding high-profile white-
collar crimes.2  His trial tactics had won him a number of high-profile cases 
in his district.  However, due to the great autonomy he has in the state-level 
prosecutor’s office, Kenneth declined to transfer to the federal agency.  
After all, Kenneth only lost one felony trial out of the one hundred forty 
cases he has tried in his ten years with the prosecutor’s office.3
During one of his most recent murder trials, Kenneth stood up before 
the twelve-member jury and gave a compelling closing argument that 
included all of the standard bells and whistles.4  For example, he took the 
jury through each critical fact leading to how he believed the defendant 
killed the victim.  He used every graphic and gory word he could think of to 
describe the murder, and he imitated how the defendant may have stabbed 
the victim during their domestic altercation.  The only missing element in 
Kenneth’s case was the victim’s body.5  There was blood on one of the 
defendant’s kitchen knives, but that was all of the physical evidence the 
prosecution had against this defendant.  The jury’s demeanor during the 
trial seemed to indicate that it was willing to convict the defendant because 
he was a construction worker who dealt exclusively with burying pipelines 
                                                                                                                 
 2. Geraldine Szott Moohr, Prosecutorial Power in an Adversarial System:  Lessons 
from Current White Collar Cases and the Inquisitorial Model, 8 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 165 
(2004). 
 3. See Lawton Cummings, Can An Ethical Person Be an Ethical Prosecutor? A 
Social Cognitive Approach to Systemic Reform, 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 2139, 2148 
[hereinafter Ethical Prosecutor] (noting that a prosecutor’s career is directly hampered or 
enhanced by his conviction rates).  In most jurisdictions, the prosecutors who obtain "the 
highest conviction rates . . . stand to make  the greatest chance for advancement internally."  
Id. (quoting Daniel S. Medwed, The Zeal Deal:  Prosecutorial Resistance to Post Conviction 
Claims of Innocence, 84 B.U. L. REV. 125, 134–35 (2004), [hereinafter Prosecutorial 
Resistance]); see also Richard T. Boylan, What Do Prosecutors Maximize?  Evidence from 
Careers of U.S. Attorneys, 7 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 379, 396 (2005). 
 4. See Helena Whalen-Bridge, The Lost Narrative:  The Connection Between Legal 
Narrative and Legal Ethics, 7 J. ASS’N LEGAL WRITING DIRECTORS 229, 232 (2010) (noting 
that a segment of legal scholars have decided to insert the use of narratives into their 
scholarship, either by incorporating the author’s own true story or experience or that of 
another when interacting with a law, or by creating fictional accounts of people’s 
experiences with a law). 
 5. See Alder v. Burt, 240 F. Supp. 2d 651, 665–71 (E.D. Mich. 2003) (finding that 
the prosecutor was reasonably inferring from the evidence when he stated that petitioner 
forced himself into the bedroom and burned the victim’s body to destroy the evidence); see 
also Epperly v. Booker, 997 F.2d 1, 3 (4th Cir. 1993) (upholding a conviction for murder 
even though the victim’s body was never found and all of the evidence was circumstantial).
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for commercial businesses.  Kenneth believed that the defendant was the 
only reasonable suspect that could have killed his thirty-year-old girlfriend.6
The victim had been living with the defendant for several years, and 
after a heated argument one night, the victim was never seen or heard from 
again.  The defendant reported the victim missing three days later.  The 
police immediately targeted him for the incident.  After several weeks of 
searching the city, the District Attorney filed a murder charge against the 
defendant because of the trace amount of blood on the kitchen knife and 
due to the defendant’s experience as a construction specialist.  The District 
Attorney’s Office, the Mayor’s Office, and the Attorney General 
desperately7 wanted the defendant to be prosecuted for this crime.8
Dressed in his usual dark pinstriped suit, Kenneth paced back and forth 
arguing how he believed this defendant committed the murder.  He raised 
and lowered his voice at just the right moment to keep the jury’s attention.9
Everything Kenneth did during his closing argument was in his usual 
modus operandi until he gave his final salutation to the jury.  When he 
thanked the jury for its time and attention, Kenneth placed his right hand on 
his left shoulder with his fingers positioned in the Hawaiian "hang loose" 
                                                                                                                 
 6. See Carolyn Grose, Storytelling Across the Curriculum: From Margin to Center, 
from Clinic to the Classroom, 7 J. ASS’N LEGAL WRITING DIRECTORS 37, 47 (emphasizing 
that in order to produce competent professionals, many scholars and professors have brought 
together doctrine, skills, and values using a narrative theory and storytelling to focus their 
audience’s attention on particular values like anti-racism, justice, cross-cultural competence, 
ethics, creativity, and compassion) (citing ROY STUCKEY, BEST PRACTICES FOR LEGAL 
EDUCATION: A VISION AND A ROAD MAP 105 (Clinic Legal Educ. Ass’n 2007)). 
 7. See Geoffrey S. Corn, Imputed Liability for Supervising Prosecutors: Applying the 
Military Doctrine of Command Responsibility to Reduce Prosecutorial Misconduct, 14 
BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 395, 412 (2009) (arguing that imputed liability should be lodged 
against the prosecutor’s supervisor or commander, and explaining that this form of liability 
is based on the failure of the supervising prosecutor to take remedial measures when they are 
aware of the risk that misconduct will occur). 
 8. See Ethical Prosecutor, supra note 3, at 2152 (noting that  prosecutors often 
receive intense internal and external pressures to convict at all costs). Therefore, the lack of 
sanctions for ethical violations actually generates the win-at-all-costs mentality that they 
need to relentlessly pursue a defendant for a felony crime.  Id.
 9. See Charles Becton, Using Your Voice in Closing Argument, 842 PRAC. L. INST.
383 (2010) (noting that the way to communicate the strength of your conviction in your 
client’s cause to the jury is by the effective use of your voice (quoting Sir Ernest Barker, 
THE COMPLETE PLAYS OF WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, at xx (1984)). The author continues by 
noting that an attorney’s voice should have: 
[A] musical power, which . . . so choos[es] the "notes" or sounds of words, and 
set[s] them in such a sequence of harmony, that they [charm] the ear with music 
at the same time that they [delight] the mind with meaning.   
Id.
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sign and politely bowed before the jury.  Derrick, defense counsel for the 
accused, found this gesture quite strange and so did the defendant.  Because 
Kenneth could not overcome the fact that his case did not include the actual 
body or remains of the alleged victim, Defense Counsel sincerely believed 
that the result would either be a hung jury or an acquittal.10
For two hours, the jury deliberated and as each minute that went by, 
Derrick felt more and more confident that his client was going to be 
acquitted.  Suddenly, the court announced that the jury had reached a 
verdict.  Several minutes later, the jury entered the room.  Derrick and his 
client both stood up and buttoned their jackets.  The foreperson raised the 
small sheet of paper to his eyes and stated that the jury had found the 
defendant guilty as charged.  The defendant dropped to his chair.  Derrick 
rubbed his client’s shoulder in disbelief.  One thing that he knew without a 
doubt was that Kenneth had an inside track to this jury because the 
evidence was too weak to convict his client of second degree murder.  He 
watched with disdain as the jury marched out of the courtroom, and he 
vowed to his client that he would not only appeal the conviction, but he also 
declared that he would do whatever he could to get his conviction reversed. 
At sentencing, Derrick requested the court to grant his post verdict 
judgment of acquittal or at least a new trial.  The district court politely 
denied all defense motions, and gave the defendant the mandatory life 
sentence.11  Approximately one month after his client was convicted of 
second degree murder, Derrick began combing through all of the jury 
questionnaires, hoping to find some evidence of impropriety on the State’s 
behalf.  One by one, Derrick reviewed and dismissed each of the 
questionnaires, finding nothing to justify a claim of prosecutorial 
misdealing.12
After doing a little more research, Derrick narrowed his review to 
the foreperson, who happened to be a divorcee, and a football coach at 
a popular high school in the city.  Since it was football season, he 
decided to attend the homecoming game for this particular high school.  
                                                                                                                 
 10. See Ramsammy v. State, 43 So.3d 100, 100 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.  2010) 
(emphasizing that despite the inability to find the victim’s body, the State can still prove the 
fact that the victim in a murder case is dead by competent, substantial evidence). 
 11. See LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 14:30.1 (2006) (setting forth the statutory 
elements of Second Degree Murder in Louisiana state law). 
 12. See Malia N. Brink, A Pendulum Swung Too Far:  Why the Supreme Court Must 
Place Limits on Prosecutorial Immunity, 4 CHARLESTON L. REV. 1, 18 (2009) (noting that 
prosecutorial misconduct is not easily discovered because it is inherently difficult for 
defense attorneys and defendants alike to find out that exculpatory material was withheld or 
that information giving rise to a viable defense even existed). 
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Dressed in typical football-day attire, Derrick watched the football 
coach attentively as the coach barked orders to the players and to the 
referees.  Nothing triggered any suspicion until he saw Kenneth 
approach the football coach with a big grin on his face.  Derrick stood 
up and witnessed something that he had been searching for two months 
to see—a connection between the jury and Kenneth.13
Kenneth shook the coach’s hand, and placed his right hand on his 
left shoulder—the same hand gesture he used in court on the day 
Kenneth gave his closing arguments.14  Two days later, Derrick located 
the coach’s ex-wife, and during their meeting, he learned that the hand 
signal the prosecutor used during trial was a fraternity symbol, which 
symbolized loyalty and brotherhood.15  He also learned that Kenneth 
had helped the couple several years earlier when their son was accused 
of aggravated battery following a football game. 
Derrick pulled the transcripts and the coach’s questionnaire for a 
second review. He realized that while the coach did not deny knowing 
Kenneth during voir dire, he certainly did not give the court a full 
appreciation of the extent of his relationship to Kenneth—especially 
the fact that he was in a fraternity with him. More importantly, 
Kenneth purposefully did not disclose the extent of his relationship to 
this coach nor did he advise the court that he executed a plea 
agreement with the coach’s son regarding an aggravated battery 
charge.16
Was Kenneth’s behavior a form of prosecutorial misconduct?  
Kenneth’s failure to disclose the depth of his relationship with the 
jury’s foreperson may prove to be sufficient grounds to reverse the 
                                                                                                                 
 13. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 8.3(a) (1983) (dictating that a lawyer is 
not required to conduct an investigation and make a definitive decision that a violation has 
occurred before the duty to report a violation is triggered). 
 14. See Erica Summer, Post-Trial Jury Payoffs:  A Jury Tampering Loophole, 15 ST.
JOHN’S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 353, 354 (2001) (noting that certain permissible inferences can 
be used to show the requisite mental state). 
 15. See id. at 365 (noting a jury’s responsibility to "remain impartial . . . [in] the 
interests of justice . . . to help insure a fair trial; [noting] further, there is a good chance that a 
juror will be tempted by an unspoken offer orchestrated by a litigant and swayed by the 
possibility of a post-verdict payoff"). 
 16. See Benjamin M. Lawsky, Limitations on Attorney Post-Verdict Contact with 
Jurors:  Protecting the Criminal Jury and Its Verdict at the Expense of the Defendant, 94 
COLUM. L. REV. 1950, 1952 (1994) (noting the drafters of the ABA Code of Professional 
Responsibility did not find it to be unethical for a lawyer to talk to or question jurors, but did 
find it impermissible for the said lawyer to harass, entice, induce or exert influence on a 
juror to obtain his testimony). 
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defendant’s conviction and sentence.17  Ideally, this particular 
defendant may have a valid § 1983 civil rights action against the 
District Attorney’s office if the appeal of his conviction and sentence 
was successful. 18  But he would first have to show that Kenneth’s 
actions were not covered by the absolute immunity umbrella—a 
phenomenon that seems to always make prosecutors invincible when it 
concerns a criminal prosecution.19
The United States Supreme Court’s decision in Van De Kamp v. 
Goldstein,20 indicated that prosecutors like Kenneth should not be 
penalized for using trial tactics like the one used above because of the 
enormous responsibilities they have in the adversarial criminal justice 
system.  To this Court, it was better "to leave unredressed the wrongs 
done by a dishonest officer(s) than to subject those who try to do their 
duty to [the] constant dread of retaliation."21  In other words, the 
                                                                                                                 
 17. See Carissa Hessick, Prosecutorial Subordination of Perjury:  Is the Fair Justice 
Agency the Solution We Have Been Looking for?, 47 S.D. L. Rev. 255, 268, [hereinafter 
Prosecutorial Subordination of Perjury] (declaring that "most subordination of perjury 
claims against prosecutors are not discovered until long after the trial is over).  
 18. See Civil Action for Deprivation of Rights, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1996) [hereinafter 
§ 1983] ("[E]very person who, under color of state law, deprives an individual of any rights, 
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party 
injured in an action at law."); see also Alexandria White Dunahoe, Revisiting the Cost-
Benefit Calculus of the Misbehaving Prosecutor:  Deterrence Economics and Transitory 
Prosecutors, 61 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 45, 48 (2005) ("[W]here the Constitution 
guarantees a right, constitutional tort law can, in some instances, operate to provide a civil 
remedy and such a remedial scheme exists in the Federal Civil Rights Act of 1871 
(§ 1983)."); Richardson v. McKnight, 521 U.S. 399, 403 (1997) (emphasizing that § 1983 
seeks "to deter state actors from using the badge of their authority to deprive individuals of 
their federally guaranteed rights and to provide related relief" (quoting Wyatt v. Cole, 504 
U.S. 158, 161 (1992)); Daniels v. Kieser, 441 U.S. 931 (1978) (indicating that a prosecutor 
does not have absolute immunity for anything he does once trial has begun; rather, immunity 
is absolute only when he is performing quasi-judicial functions).  When he is acting in an 
administrative or investigative capacity, the immunity may be qualified.  Id.; The United 
States as a Defendant, 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 1346(b), 2671–2680 (West 2011) (stating that the 
Liability Reform Act immunizes federal employees for liability for allegedly slanderous 
conduct committed within scope of employment). 
 19. See § 1983, supra note 18 ("[I]n any action brought against a judicial officer for an 
act or omission taken in such officer’s judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted 
unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable."); see also
Chavers v. Stuhmer, 786 F. Supp. 756 (E.D. Wis. 1992) (stating that the concept of absolute 
immunity protects prosecutors from civil liability so long as the conduct giving rise to the 
complaint stems from actions that are "intimately associated" with the judicial phase of the 
criminal process (quoting Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478 (1991)). 
 20. See Van de Kamp v. Goldstein, 129 S. Ct. 855, 858 (2009) (holding that 
prosecutors have absolute immunity for actions associated with the judicial phase of trial). 
 21. Id. at 860. 
ABSOLUTE IMMUNITY 339 
United States Supreme Court simply reversed the proverbial phrase to 
say that one bad apple, should not and does not spoil the bunch.
The Court’s discussion of Van De Kamp—in essence—has given 
rogue prosecutors the necessary ammunition they need to implement 
whatever trial strategy they deem appropriate to secure a conviction.22
More importantly, will the Court’s decision in Van De Kamp
encourage federal prosecutors—and prosecutors in general—to push 
the envelope even further since the Supreme Court was apparently 
reluctant to dismantle the absolute immunity shield?  Some could 
argue that as the shield grows larger and covers more areas, 
prosecutors become more and more ruthless towards criminal 
defendants.  The case of Pottawattamine County v. McGhee,23 would 
have been an ideal case for our discussion regarding the role of 
absolute immunity in the prosecutor’s arsenal; however, the Supreme 
Court was not given an opportunity to release a decision in this matter 
because the parties ultimately settled.24
Most defense attorneys would not dispute the fact that Kenneth’s 
behavior had undermined the legitimacy of the defendant’s conviction.  
Kenneth used his relationship with a fraternity brother to gain leverage 
against a defendant who was undergoing public scrutiny for murdering 
his girlfriend.  It is obvious that Kenneth was silent about the depth of 
his relationship with this high school coach; however, it was the 
manner in which he reminded this coach about his fraternal duty of 
loyalty and brotherhood that should cause the legal community to be 
disillusioned.  His behavior was unethical and unprofessional, but most 
courts would not dare to pronounce his behavior as prosecutorial 
misconduct. 
Some trial attorneys, including this Author would hesitate to 
describe Kenneth’s actions as a form of jury tampering.25 Such an 
                                                                                                                 
 22. See id. at 858–59 (finding that a prosecutor enjoys absolute immunity despite 
failing to disclose impeachment material). 
 23. See Pottawattamie County v. McGhee, No. 08-1065 (U.S. argued Nov. 4, 2009) 
(questioning whether a prosecutor may be subjected to a civil trial and damages for a 
wrongful conviction for procuring false testimony during a criminal investigation, in 
violation of the defendant’s substantive due process rights). 
24. See Pottawattamie County v. McGhee, 130 S.Ct. 1047 (2010) dismissing the writ 
of certiorari pursuant to Rule 46 of the Rules of the Supreme Court). 
 25. See United States v. Locasscio, 6 F.3d 924, 947 (2d Cir. 1993) (describing a 
situation in which the prosecutor inflamed the jury by suggesting that the jury was 
sequestered to prevent jury tampering by the defendant’s alleged crime family); see also
Barnett v. United States, 870 F. Supp. 1197 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (stating that a prosecutor’s act 
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accusation would be difficult to prove because while the potential juror 
admitted to knowing Kenneth, neither he nor Kenneth gave opposing 
counsel or the district judge26 an appreciation of the extent of their 
relationship,27and neither party questioned them on this issue during 
voir dire. 
Legal scholars and many seasoned defense attorneys could argue 
that voir dire was the proper procedural vehicle for Derrick to use to 
question this potential juror regarding the depth and length of his 
relationship with Kenneth.  Using a peremptory challenge against this 
foreperson could have insured that he would not have been impaneled.  
But should defense counsel’s failure to use a peremptory challenge 
against this person relieve Kenneth of his continuing duty to fully 
disclose his relationship with persons qualifying for jury service.  
Further, should Kenneth be reprimanded by the court for his lack of 
candor and willful evasiveness? 
Let’s assume that after several years of unsuccessfully defending 
his appeal before the appellate courts, Derrick filed a federal habeas 
corpus pleading in the federal courts arguing that his client’s 
conviction should be reversed.   Looking at the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Van de Kamp, should Derrick expect another defeat? 
In Van de Kamp, the respondent, Thomas Goldstein, was an 
honorable soldier in the United States Marine Corps and an 
engineering student when he was arrested for murder in the late 
1970s.28  Goldstein did not have a criminal history.29  He did not own a 
firearm, and there was no information to suggest that Goldstein even 
knew the victim.30  There was no physical evidence linking Goldstein 
                                                                                                                 
of indiscreetly bringing in evidence without the defense’s knowledge and then removing it 
was grounds for arguing jury tampering by the government on appeal). 
 26. See Bert Brandenburg, The Role of Public Opinion in the Debate over Recusal 
Reform, 58 DRAKE L. REV. 737, 748 (2010) (noting that the role of public opinion weighs 
heavily on recusal decisions among judges, and more importantly, judges must remember 
that their decisions must satisfy the concept of "reasonableness" so that the health and 
legitimacy of the judiciary is maintained). 
 27. See Erica Summer, Post-Trial Jury Payoffs:  A Jury Tampering Loophole, 15 ST.
JOHN’S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 353, 353 (2001) (noting that "[a]ny attempt to corrupt or 
influence a jury for the purpose of manipulating a determination by any means other than 
presenting evidence or argument in court does not fall within the meaning of jury 
tampering"). 
 28. Goldstein v. Superior Court, 65 Cal.Rptr. 3d 90, 92 (Cal.Ct.App. 2007) (providing 
the factual background to Van de Kamp v. Goldstein, 129 S. Ct. 855 (2009). 
 29. Id.
 30. Id. 
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to the victim.31  In fact, Goldstein, like most defendants in our criminal 
justice system, became a suspect because he matched the internal 
police stereotype of who  the officers should classify as a potential 
suspect.32  Accordingly, Goldstein was arrested and both the 
prosecutors and the police officers deferred getting any credible 
evidence against Goldstein until he was formerly arrested.33
Without any physical evidence or eyewitnesses to support 
Goldstein’s conviction for murder, the police turned to getting a 
confession from Goldstein in order to make their jobs easier.34  While 
the police were not going to risk talking to Goldstein themselves, they 
did intend to get Goldstein to make an admission to someone that he 
might feel comfortable talking to—a cellmate.35
Eddie Fink was a heroin addict and someone who was well 
acquainted with the prison system.36  Not only was Fink a known 
criminal, but he had a talent for getting some of the inmates to trust 
him and to tell him things that they would not ordinarily tell family, 
friends, and definitely not the police.37  Fink’s talent was so well 
known among police and prosecutors that prosecutors began to use him 
for some of their most difficult cases.38
In exchange for his assistance, the prosecutors agreed to offer 
Fink favorable dispositions in all of his pending cases in their office.39
Fink allegedly secured a statement from Goldstein that supposedly 
implicated him in the murder.  The prosecutors used this statement and 
Goldstein was ultimately convicted.40  Ten years after his conviction, 
Goldstein learned that the District Attorney had on-going agreements 
                                                                                                                 
 31. Id. 
 32. See id. (stating that police detectives pursued Goldstein because a witness said the 
gunman could have been Goldstein and that detectives influenced that witness’s testimony). 
 33. See Van de Kamp, 129 U.S. at 859.  See id. (stating that there was no forensic 
evidence or suggestion by those acquainted with the victim that Goldstein had contact with 
the victim). 
 34. Id.
 35. See id. (describing how Edward Fink was placed in the same cell as Goldstein). 
 36. See id. (stating that Edward Fink had several prior felony convictions). 
 37. See (Brief for Respondent at *3, Van de Kamp v. Goldstein, 129 S. Ct. 855 (2009) 
(No. 07–854) ("Fink had an uncanny knack for extracting confessions from cellmates."). 
 38. See Van de Kamp, 129 U.S. at 859.  See id. (stating that Fink testified to jailhouse 
confessions in return for favorable dispositions on many occasions). 
 39. See id. at *4 (stating that the District Attorney’s office promised to cut Fink’s 
sentence on a pending charge from sixteen months to less than two months). 
 40. Id.
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with various jailhouse informants, including Eddie Fink.41  Goldstein 
knew that Fink’s testimony was false.  He knew that the District 
Attorney’s office was only using Fink’s testimony because they did not 
have any credible evidence against him.  Now, he had what he needed 
to prove his innocence. 
Unfortunately, it was twenty-four years after his conviction and 
during a federal habeas corpus hearing that Goldstein was able to 
challenge the constitutionality of his conviction.42  He argued in his 
brief that the prosecutor’s use of Fink’s testimony without revealing 
the standing agreement his office had with Fink prior to trial was 
reversible error.43  Thus, according to Goldstein, the prosecutors 
abused its authority by not disclosing this information to his attorney 
pursuant to Brady v. Maryland44 and Giglio v. United States.45   The 
district court agreed, and vacated Goldstein’s conviction because the 
information that was not disclosed severely jeopardized his defense 
and created undue leverage in the prosecution’s favor.46
In Brady, both the defendant (Brady) and a co-defendant were 
convicted of first degree murder and given a death sentence after their 
convictions.47  The defendant’s trial counsel later learned that his 
client’s co-defendant had previously admitted to actually killing the 
victim during the discovery phase of the case, but said information had 
been intentionally withheld by the prosecution.48  The defendant 
immediately filed an application for post conviction relief, arguing that 
he was entitled to a new trial due to the prosecution’s failure to deliver 
this vital information to his attorney prior to the trial.49  The district 
court disagreed, but the Maryland appellate court opined that the 
prosecution’s failure to submit all statements to the defendant’s 
                                                                                                                 
 41. See id. at *5 (describing how the jailhouse informant scandal broke a decade after 
Mr. Goldstein’s trial). 
 42. Id.
 43. Van de Kamp v. Goldstein, 129 S. Ct. 855, 859 (2009). 
 44. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 84 (1963) (holding that withholding evidence 
material to either the guilt of the defendant or the punishment administered by the Court is a 
violation of due process). 
 45. Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 153 (1972) (holding that nondisclosure of 
evidence affecting the credibility of a witness is suppression of material evidence and 
justifies a new trial, irrespective of the good faith of the prosecution). 
 46. Van de Kamp, 129 S. Ct. at 859. 
 47. Brady, 373 U.S. at 84. 
 48. Id.
 49. Id.
ABSOLUTE IMMUNITY 343 
attorney denied this defendant his right to due process and it remanded 
the case for a new trial, but only as it related to punishment, not guilt.50
The United States Supreme Court granted writs, and ultimately 
agreed that the prosecution’s suppression of the extra-judicial 
statement was a violation of due process.51 However, it concluded that 
remanding the case to the district court for a retrial as to punishment 
was not a violation of due process since the defense’s potential use of 
this incriminating statement by the co-defendant would not have 
produced a conviction less than murder in the first degree.52  Thus, the 
high court concluded that the defendant’s due process rights were not 
"technically" violated. 
In Giglio v. United States, the defendant (Giglio) appealed the 
district court’s denial of his motion for a new trial after he uncovered 
information that the government promised not to prosecute a co-
conspirator if he testified against the defendant.53  The government 
failed to disclose this information to Giglio’s attorney.54  Because this 
co-conspirator was a key witness in the government’s case, the 
Supreme Court held that a new trial was warranted because this 
witness’ credibility was a critical issue for the jury and the jury was 
entitled to know whether the co-conspirator was truthful.55
In light of both Brady and Giglio, Goldstein surmised that he was 
entitled not only to a reversal of his conviction, but he also believed 
that he could override the prosecution’s immunity claim and establish 
his entitlement to compensation from the District Attorney’s office 
through a § 1983 civil rights action.56  But first, Goldstein needed to 
                                                                                                                 
 50. Id. at 85. 
 51. Id. at 87 (stating definitively that the prosecution’s suppression of favorable 
evidence from the accused despite his request for such information violates due process 
where such evidence is material to either the guilt or punishment of the accused). 
 52. See Brady, 373 U.S. at 95 (vacating the judgment of the State Court of Appeals). 
 53. Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 150–51 (1972). 
 54. Id. at 151. 
 55. Id. at 154 (noting that whether nondisclosure is a result of "negligence or design," 
it is the responsibility of the prosecutor, and also noting that the Government’s case 
depended "almost entirely" on the witness’s statement and the witness’s credibility); see also
Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 272 (1959) (finding similarly that the State’s use of known 
false evidence that is material to the defendant’s guilt or punishment is incompatible with 
"rudimentary demands of justice"); Pyle v. Kansas, 317 U.S. 213, 216 (1942) (holding that a 
perjured testimony knowingly used by state authorities constitutes a denial of the 
defendant’s right to due process). 
 56. See § 1983, supra note 18 and accompanying text (stating that injunctive relief 
shall not be granted against a judicial officer unless a declaratory decree was violated or 
344 17 WASH. & LEE J.C.R. & SOC. JUST. 333 (2011)
clear the absolute immunity hurdle.57  This hurdle proved to be much 
higher than what Goldstein had originally thought.  He attempted to 
pierce the immunity veil by describing the prosecutor’s failure to 
disclose the on-going relationship Fink had with the prosecutor’s 
office as being an administrative, not a prosecutorial function.58  The 
Supreme Court disagreed, choosing to group every decision made by a 
prosecutor in a criminal case as ultimately being judicial in nature.59
Prosecutorial misconduct is nothing new in the world of criminal 
defense.  Defense attorneys as well as their individual clients can share 
hundreds, if not thousands, of stories in which prosecutors have 
falsified or hid crucial evidence from them or had manipulated the 
testimony of various witnesses for the purpose of securing a 
conviction.  Yet, the courts have been quite hesitant to seriously 
discipline these prosecutors for their unethical behavior.60
For instance, the judges on the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Sixth Circuit strongly reprimanded federal prosecutors for their 
"win at any cost"61 demeanor in the John Demjanjuk case in 1993.62
                                                                                                                 
declaratory relief was unavailable). 
 57. See Van De Kamp v. Goldstein, 129 S. Ct. 855, 860–61 (2009) (noting that 
prosecutors possess absolute immunity under the law when acting in their role as an officer 
of the court).
 58. See id. at 862 ("We agree with Goldstein that, in making these claims, he attacks 
the office’s administrative procedures."). 
 59. Id. at 861–62 (finding that the prosecutor’s actions warranted the same absolute 
immunity as other prosecutorial conduct because the direct relationship between a 
prosecutor’s administrative obligations and conduct at trial made these obligations distinct 
from ordinary administrative duties). 
 60. See United States v. Martinez-Medina, 279 F.3d 105, 118 (1st Cir. 2002) 
(determining that despite the jeopardy to the defendant’s fair trial, inducements given to 
government witnesses were acceptable as long procedural safeguards remained in place and 
that improper remarks made by the prosecutor at summation failed to create cause for a new 
trial). 
 61. See Ethical Prosecutor, supra note 3, at 2147 (commenting that legal scholars 
have classified this type of phenomenon as conviction psychology, which focuses on the 
pressures that induce some prosecutors to obtain convictions at the expense of their ethical 
standards). 
 62. See Demjanjuk v. Petrosky, 10 F.3d 338, 356 (6th Cir. 1993) (finding that 
prosecutors engaged in prosecutorial misconduct by failing to disclose exculpatory 
information implicating a different soldier for the Nazi wartime activities that led Demjanuk 
to be extradited to Israel to face a capital trial); see also Michael Gaugh, Note, The Strange 
Case of John Demjanjuk:  An Argument for a Higher Ethical Standard in Immigration 
Proceedings Based on Criminal Conduct, 7 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 783, 791 (1994) 
(describing the Sixth Circuit’s conclusion that the failure to disclose represented a reckless 
indifference towards discovery obligations and duties to the court). 
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Not only did these prosecutors withhold crucial exculpatory evidence 
from opposing attorneys, but there was even evidence to show that 
Demjanjuk may have been misidentified as the sadistic guard at the 
Nazi death camp named "Ivan the Terrible,"63 who murdered hundreds 
of thousands in the Nazi concentration camps in Sobibor, Poland.64
In another matter, a federal district court in Illinois ordered new 
trials for defendants convicted under the Racketeer Influenced and 
Corrupt Organizations (RICO)65 statute for supplying drugs to local 
gangs.  Defendants discovered that key government witnesses were 
permitted—with the government’s blessings—to obtain and use illegal 
drugs during the time that they were inmates at a federal prison.66  It 
was also discovered that these witnesses received several other 
substantial benefits from the government in exchange for their 
testimony—all of which was not disclosed to defense attorneys prior to 
trial.67  In other words, the federal government abused its duty to 
investigate, report, and prosecute these offenses due to their 
overwhelming desire to secure a conviction at any cost.68   The exact 
same allegation was lodged against the prosecutors in the United States 
v. Boyd case, which the federal judge upheld and also ordered a new 
trial.69
In Santa Clara County, California, local citizens had to endure 
paying over five million dollars for cases in which prosecutors either 
authorized illegal searches or wrongfully convicted its citizens for 
                                                                                                                 
 63. See Demjanjuk, 10 F.3d at 340 ("Demjanjuk’s claims of misconduct consisted of 
the government’s failure to disclose information that pointed to another Ukrainian guard at 
Treblinka, Ivan Marchenko, as ‘Ivan the Terrible.’"). 
 64. See United Press International, Demjanjuk’s Statement to Judges, PHILA.
INQUIRER, Apr. 26, 1988, at A04 (reporting the atrocities linked to Ivan the Terrible). 
 65. Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C. § 1964 
(2006). 
 66. See United States v. Burnside, 824 F. Supp. 1215, 1224–25 (N.D. Ill. 1993) 
("[T]he court must also find that government personnel . . . were aware of the continuing 
drug use by these inmate government witnesses, but did not investigate it, did not stop it, and 
did not disclose it to defense counsel or the court before or during the Burnside trial."). 
 67. See generally id.
 68. See id. at 1243 (describing the contents of a report conducted after post-trial 
hearings that provided details of the special privileges enjoyed by El Rukin government 
witnesses). 
 69. See United States v. Boyd, 833 F. Supp. 1277, 1365–66 (N.D. Ill. 1993) (ordering 
a new trial as a result of the prosecution’s failure to disclose evidence of post-incarceration 
drug use and perjury on the part of government witnesses). 
346 17 WASH. & LEE J.C.R. & SOC. JUST. 333 (2011)
various felony offenses before discovering their innocence. 70  Except 
for one county prosecutor who received constant coverage for his 
prosecutorial misdeeds, none of the county prosecutors mentioned 
suffered any personal or professional consequences for their 
unprofessional and unethical behavior.71
The instances of misconduct in our society are overwhelming—
especially in situations where children have come to idolize attorneys 
and law enforcement officials because of their influence in the 
community.  For example, how often have we heard children say that 
when they grow up they want to be police officers, firemen, judges, 
doctors, or lawyers?  Realistically, what children are seeing are 
policemen taking the law into their own hands by shooting first and 
asking questions later.72  They witness judges abusing73 their authority 
for the purpose of satisfying their sexual74 and emotional desires.75
They read about doctors who amputate the wrong limbs76 from their 
patients because they have been working double shifts at the hospitals.  
                                                                                                                 
 70. See Kathleen "Cookie" Ridolfi & Maurice Possley, Prosecutor Misconduct Has a 
High Public Cost, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, Nov. 12, 2009, at 8A (discussing different 
incidents that served as the basis for some of the prosecutorial misconduct charges that 
contributed to an increased cost for taxpayers). 
 71. Id. and accompanying text. 
 72. See Brendan McCarthy, Glover Case Echoes Era of Algiers Seven:  Lessons of 30 
Years Ago Were Never Learned, Some Say, TIMES-PICAYUNE, Nov. 7, 2010, at A (analyzing 
the parallels between an incident in the 1970s where police shot four men in retaliation for 
an officer’s death and an incident of police brutality against one man after Hurricane 
Katrina). 
 73. See Jones v. Luebbers, 359 F.3d 1005, 1009 (8th Cir. 2004) (evaluating a judge’s 
action for bias based on the claim that he dealt with the defense attorney angrily as a result 
of an ill will against the attorney that developed in previous cases). 
 74. Greg Bluestein, Federal Judge Pleads Guilty to 2 Drug Charges, THE WASH.
TIMES, Nov. 19, 2010, at 1–2 (reporting that a federal district judge plead guilty to 
possession of illegal drugs and for giving a stripper possession of his government issued 
laptop).  The sixty-seven-year-old jurist admitted to knowing about the stripper’s felony 
conviction and conceded to having at least two handguns in his possession.  Id.
 75. See Double Standard:  Special Court Should Reconsider Dismissal of Complaints 
Against Judge Keller. HOUS. CHRON., Nov. 5, 2010, at B8 (stating that a Texas judge 
prevented the clerk’s office from accepting the last-minute stay of execution by refusing to 
extend its hours, even though a pending Supreme Court consideration alerted the judge to 
the forthcoming stay).  The commission reviewing the judge’s actions issued only a 
relatively mild public warning.  Id.
 76. See Mireya Navarro, Confidence Shaken, Hospital Tries to Bounce Back After 
Series of Errors, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 14, 1995, at § 10 (describing a series of errors in 
treatment at University Community Hospital in Tampa, including the amputation of the 
wrong leg on one patient). 
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They also see lawyers who have either deceived or stolen from their 
clients to become instant millionaires. 
To add insult to injury, we are now witnessing a season of 
unaccountability where federal employees,77 whom we have entrusted78
with the responsibility of prosecuting criminals, actually engage in 
criminal behavior to get convictions. Understandably, the weight that 
rests on a prosecutor’s shoulders is great,79 but the harm caused to the 
justice system and the general public is even greater. 
Indeed, the most frequently articulated goals of professional 
discipline systems coincide neatly with the goals of deterrence 
remedies of prosecutorial misconduct:  the protection of the 
public,80 the protection of the administration of justice,81 and the 
preservation of confidence in the legal profession.82
                                                                                                                 
 77. See Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 515 (1978) (expanding absolute immunity 
from civil liability to cover state and federal agencies that customarily perform certain 
functions that are analogous to those of a prosecutor). 
 78. See In Re Jordan, 913 So. 2d 775, 781 (La. 2005) (stating that "a prosecutor stands 
as the representative of the people of the State, and he is entrusted with upholding the 
integrity of the criminal justice system by ensuring that justice is served for both the victims 
of crimes and the accused"). 
 79. See Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U S. 409, 427 n.25 (1976) (describing the different 
prosecutorial obligations, such as turning over evidence to the defense that calls the 
conviction into question, that might suffer if the prosecutor is faced with the prospect of 
liability) (citing MODELCODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-13 (1969)). 
 80. See, e.g., In re Abrams, 689 A.2d 6, 12 (D. C. 1997) (pointing to the protection of 
the public an important rationale for disciplinary proceedings); In re Olson, 577 N.W.2d 
218, 220 (Minn. 1998) ("The primary purpose of attorney discipline is protection of the 
public."); In re Imbriani, 694 A. 2d 1030, 1035 (N.J. 1997) ("The primary purpose of a 
disciplinary proceeding is to protect the public, not to punish attorneys."); In re Curran, 801 
P.2d 962, 974 (Wash. 1990) (emphasizing the need to uphold rules of conduct to preserve 
confidence in the bar). 
 81. See, e.g., In re Chandler, 641 N.E.2d 473, 479 (Ill. 1994) (noting that the most 
effective way to protect the public and the legal profession is to impose fairly balanced 
disciplinary sanctions); Statewide Greviance Comm’n v. Botwick, 627 A.2d 901, 906 (Conn. 
1993) (stating that disciplinary proceedings protect the administration of justice); In re
Bourcier, 939 P.2d 604, 608 (Or. 1997) ("The purpose of a lawyer disciplinary proceeding is 
to protect the public and the administration of justice from lawyers who have not discharged, 
will not discharge, or are unlikely to discharge properly their professional duties to clients, 
the public, the legal system, and the legal profession."). 
 82. See, e.g., Emil v. The Mississippi State Bar, 690 So. 2d 301, 327 (Miss. 1997) 
("Public policy demands that we adequately discipline unethical attorneys to preserve the 
dignity and reputation of the legal profession."); In re Berk, 602 A.2d 946, 950 (Vt. 1991) 
(noting that the attorney’s lack of professional responsibility would reduce public confidence 
in the legal profession). 
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On the other hand, how to prosecute the prosecutor has always been 
the "pink elephant in the room"83 from the judiciary’s viewpoint.84  Was the 
offending prosecutor simply an overzealous advocate for justice or was his 
actions done to advance certain career objectives?85  Further, was the 
violation constitutional in nature such that the only viable remedy is the 
defendant’s release with an apology from the state? 
Part I of this article will evaluate the source of the prosecutor’s 
authority and then track the development of absolute and qualified 
immunity.86   Part I will also include a discussion of why a prosecutor’s 
unethical and often criminal behavior will not automatically result in the 
dilution of the immunity defense from absolute to qualified. 87
Part II of this Article will explain how twenty-first century jurists, 
including the United States Supreme Court, have made characteristics like 
honor, professionalism, and integrity secondary in light of  Van De Kamp
and Pottawattamie.
Finally, Part III will expound on the strong reluctance the legal 
community has with  imposing § 1983 sanctions against those agencies that 
have either employed, trained, and promoted prosecutors or other law 
enforcement officials who have committed heinous constitutional offenses. 
Part III will also address why judges and disciplinary associations are inept 
to deal with the overwhelming claims of misconduct lodged by wrongfully 
                                                                                                                 
 83. See Lyn M. Morton, Seeking the Elusive Remedy for Prosecutorial Misconduct:  
Suppression, Dismissal, or Discipline? 7 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1083, 1086 (1994) 
(explaining that there is such a strong public and political outcry for a tougher stance against 
crime, prosecutors are boldly crossing ethical boundaries with very few, if any 
repercussions, because there are so few remedial solutions available that can counter the 
misconduct). 
 84. See Lesley E. Williams, The Civil Regulation of Prosecutors, 67 FORDHAM L. REV.
3441, 3447 (1999) (arguing that the absence of specific rules addressing the prohibited 
conduct of prosecutors obliged the ABA, along with the judiciary, the Department of Justice 
and local prosecutor associations to collaborate and define the parameters of acceptable and 
unacceptable behavior for prosecutors during every stage of the criminal process). 
 85. See Ethical Prosecutor, supra note 3, at 2147 (describing the "win-at-all-cost" 
behavior of some prosecutors as "conviction psychology"). 
 86. See Hunt v. Jaglowski, 926 F.2d 689, 692 (7th Cir. 1991) (realizing that because 
there should be a form of checks and balances for prosecutors who conduct themselves 
beyond the judicial process, the federal courts have granted only qualified immunity to said 
prosecutors when their actions are either administrative or investigatory in nature). 
 87. See Mendenhall v. Riser, 213 F.3d 226, 230 (5th Cir. 2000) (emphasizing that 
qualified immunity is a mode of protection reserved for specific government officials that 
grants them "‘ample room for mistaken judgments,’ by protecting ‘all but the plainly 
incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law’") (quoting Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 
335, 343 (1986)). 
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convicted defendants.  Finally, this Author will present his proposal that 




Like the powers bestowed on the United States Attorney by the federal 
statutes,88 the Louisiana Constitution vests great authority in its District 
Attorneys, and their assistants, to preside over every criminal prosecution 
within their respective jurisdiction, to represent the State of Louisiana 
before the grand jury and to advise the grand jury after it has been 
impaneled.89 While the powers mentioned in the state’s constitution are 
intentionally vague and overbroad, these powers are attached to an 
enormous price tag that the general public must pay if these powers are ever 
abused.90  The District Attorney can impanel a grand jury to assist their 
office in investigating a criminal case, but they are not bound to adhere to 
the grand jury’s decisions.91  If there are two competing statutes whereby a 
criminal defendant can be prosecuted, it is the District Attorney who 
chooses between them and their decision cannot be persuaded by judicial 
scrutiny.92
                                                                                                                 
 88. See 28 U.S.C. § 547 (2006) (listing the powers provided for U.S. attorneys); see 
also Brawer v. Horowitz, 535 F.2d 830, 841 (3d Cir. 1976) (summarizing some of the legal 
powers of the prosecutor and policy reasons behind them); Nadler v. Mann, 951 F.2d 301, 
305 (11th Cir. 1992) (tracing the delegation of power from the President to the district 
attorney). 
 89. See LA. CONST. art. V, § 26(B) ("[A] district attorney, or his designated assistant, 
shall have charge of every criminal prosecution by the state in his district, be the 
representative of the state before the grand jury in his district, and be the legal advisor to the 
grand jury.").  He shall perform other duties provided by law.  Id.
 90. See KENNETH CULP DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE:  A PRELIMINARY INQUIRY
189 (La. State Univ. Press 1969) (finding that the prosecutor has the blessings of the court 
when he/she violates a citizen’s rights through the arbitrary and/or malevolent exercise of 
authority, inevitably resulting in harm to society and to the legal community). 
 91. See State v. Meredith, 796 So. 2d 109, 114 (La. Ct. App. 2001) (stating that the 
district attorney can, in non-capital cases, "choose to prosecute even after the grand jury 
returns a no true bill," and conversely, "can refuse to prosecute when the grand jury returns a 
true bill"). 
 92. See State v. Flores, 669 So. 2d 646, 651 (La. Ct. App. 1996) ("This statute, and the 
wide discretion given to district attorneys in prosecuting crimes, under La. Const. art. V, 
§ 26 and LaC.Cr.P. art. 61, means that, absent some unusual prejudice or special 
circumstance, an offender may be punished under any statute which proscribes his 
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Again, no one disputes the enormity of the prosecutor’s 
responsibilities or the vast number of decisions that are made while 
deciding how to charge a defendant for a particular crime.93  Rather, the 
controversy surrounds how the immunity doctrine should be applied to 
those prosecutors who seemed unmoved by a defendant’s right to a fair trial 
and to  justice.94  The prosecutors’ unfettered, unbridled, and virtually 
unrestrained discretion has so enraged the public’s sense of fair play that 
our courts can no longer maintain an apathetic approach to this issue. 
The judiciary has echoed the public’s suspicions about prosecutors, but 
are less willing95 to sustain a § 1983 complaint against a prosecutor in light 
of the immunity doctrine.  But the public’s thirst for justice and for 
constitutional fairness is not always for the benefit of the defendant who is 
moments away from being incarcerated96 or from being brought to death 
row. 
For example, in Briede v. Orleans Parish Dist. Attorney’s Office,97 the 
plaintiff filed a wrongful death and survival action against the district 
attorney’s office in New Orleans after she and her husband had been robbed 
by two men who had been arrested and were in the custody of the police 
department.98  The men were subsequently released when the prosecutor 
                                                                                                                 
conduct."). 
 93. See United States v. Henderson, 241 F.3d 638, 652 (9th Cir. 2000) (arguing that 
"prosecutors have considerable leeway to strike ‘hard blows’ based on the evidence and all 
reasonable inferences from the evidence"). 
 94. See Fred C. Zacharias, Structuring the Ethics of Prosecutorial Trial Practice:  Can 
Prosecutors Do Justice?, 44 VAND. L. REV. 45, 103 (1991) (indicating that the vague norm 
of doing "justice" is subject to the varying interpretations by different prosecutors with 
different morals and thus is less valuable as a source of guidance in the role of the 
prosecutor). 
 95. See Chavers v. Stuhmer, 786 F. Supp. 756,758–59 (E.D. Wis. 1992) (permitting 
the plaintiff to present his § 1983 claim against the detective, state prosecutor and police 
officer responsible for charging and convicting him for first degree murder).  The court 
reasoned these defendants may be entitled to qualified immunity, but not absolute immunity 
because their actions were investigatory in nature.  Id.
 96. See Peter A. Joy, The Relationship Between Prosecutorial Misconduct and 
Wrongful Convictions:  Shaping Remedies for a Broken System, 2006 WIS. L. REV. 399, 
405–06 (2006) (quoting Laura B. Myers, Bringing the Offender to Heel:  Views of the 
Criminal Courts, in AMERICANS VIEW CRIMES AND JUSTICE 46, 48 (Timothy J. Flanagan & 
Dennis R. Longmire eds., 1996) (stating that "despite the ideal that the criminal justice 
system should protect the innocent and convict only the guilty, public support for the rights 
of the accused is not clear").  Some studies show that the public believes ‘the courts undo the 
work of the police to get criminals off the street.’".  Id.
 97. Briede v. Orleans Parish Dist. Attorney’s Office, 907 So. 2d 790 (La. Ct. App. 
2006). 
 98. See id. at 791 (describing the background for the claim). 
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failed to timely charge them.99  Under the cause-in-fact analysis, the 
plaintiff argued that but for the prosecutor’s failure to formally file the 
necessary charges against these men following their arrest, she would not 
have been robbed or kidnapped and her husband would not have been shot 
in the back.100
The prosecutor’s office filed a peremptory exception of no cause of 
action101 in this case, stating that it was not a proper defendant102 because it 
did not possess the capacity to be sued.103 It also argued that the state 
constitution as well as state jurisprudence gives prosecutors absolute 
immunity from civil liability.104  Since the decision to file or not file 
formally charges against a person suspected of committing a crime was a 
prosecutorial function, the district court granted the exception and 
dismissed the plaintiff’s case.105  In affirming the district court’s ruling, the 
appellate court recited portions of the Louisiana Constitution and articles in 
the revised statutes106 and the criminal code,107 which totally erase108 any 
                                                                                                                 
 99. Id.
 100. Id.
 101. See LA. CODE CIV. PROC. ANN. art. 927(b)(4) (2010) (listing no cause of action as 
a preemptory exception). 
 102. See Briede, 907 So.2d at 791 ("The Orleans Parish District Attorney’s Office filed 
the peremptory exception of no cause of action, arguing the following:  1) that the Orleans 
Parish District Attorney’s Office is not a proper defendant, as it does not have the capacity to 
be sued."). 
 103. See LA. CONST.  art. 12, § 10 (listing the circumstances under which a state, state 
agency, or a political subdivision can have immunity from suit and liability). 
 104. See Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478, 485 (1991) (noting that the chilling effects from 
civil liability mandates that prosecutors be given immunity). 
 105. See Briede v. Orleans Parish Dist. Attorney’s Office, 907 So. 2d 790, 792 (La. Ct. 
App. 2006) (noting that the district court dismissed the suit after determining that the 
prosecutor had absolute immunity). 
 106. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN § 16:1(C) (2010).  The statute provides that: 
The district attorney for the parish of Orleans or his designated assistant shall have charge of 
every criminal prosecution by the state in the Criminal District Court for the Parish of 
Orleans, and represent the state in all matters in the Orleans Parish Juvenile Court.  The 
district attorney or his designated assistant shall be the representative of the state before the 
grand juries in the parish of Orleans and shall be the legal advisor to the grand juries. He 
shall perform other duties provided by law. 
 107. See LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN art. 381 (2010) (declaring that the entity 
authorized to bring a criminal prosecution shall do so in the name of the state for the purpose 
of punishment, and that any person injured by the commission of an offense shall not be part 
of the prosecution and cannot allege his/her rights were affected).   
 108. See Briede, 907 So. 2d at 792–93 (upholding the district court’s decision after 
finding that the applicable statutes and constitutional provisions supported the district 
attoney’s actions). 
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hope for a citizen to sue the district attorney’s office for its prosecutorial 
decisions. 
Although the legal community recognizes that prosecutors have wide 
discretion109 in making decisions relative to how they charge, investigate, 
and handle a criminal proceeding, the general public, however, is becoming 
less tolerable of the prosecutor’s immunity as well as the court’s rationale 
for granting such immunity. 
In Miller v. Spiers,110 the plaintiff brought suit against the defendant, 
who was employed as an Assistant District Attorney in New Mexico.111
The plaintiff alleged that the defendant deliberately and maliciously 
indicted him for murder because the defendant:  (1) had the grand jury112
specifically target him as a suspect in a murder that took place in the 
defendant’s jurisdiction; (2) presented false and misleading evidence to the 
second impaneled grand jury after the first grand jury refused to indict him; 
(3) obtained an arrest warrant for the plaintiff, knowing that the contents of 
the warrant were false and contained material omissions that were intended 
to create probable cause; and (4) contacted the local newspaper to inform 
one of the staff writers that  his office had uncovered evidence that 
contained the plaintiff’s DNA, linking him to the victim’s apartment.113
The defendant filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings in response to 
the plaintiff’s complaint.114
As it relates to allegations one and two, the district court found that 
absolute immunity attached to the defendant’s investigation and to his 
prosecutorial  decisions because they related to his advocacy for the state 
                                                                                                                 
 109. See J. KELLY STRADER, UNDERSTANDING WHITE COLLAR CRIME 8–9 (2d ed. 2006) 
(commenting that nothing epitomizes the vast discretion a prosecutor possesses than when 
he is processing a case involving white collar crime because many statutes are broad and 
vague, and the task of defining the particular crime falls in the first instance to prosecutors, 
and ultimately to the courts). 
 110. Miller v. Spiers, 434 F. Supp. 2d 1064 (D. N.M. 2006). 
 111. See id. at 1066 ("Defendant Paul Spiers was employed as an Assistant District 
Attorney for the Bernalillo County District Attorney’s office at the time in issue."). 
 112. See LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN art. 437 (2010) (stating that the grand jury will 
inquire into offenses at the request of the district attorney); see also United States v. 
Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 344 (1974) ("Such an investigation may be triggered by tips, 
rumors, evidence proffered by the prosecutor, or the personal knowledge of the grand 
jurors."). 
 113. See Miller, 434 F. Supp. 2d at 1067–68 (describing the allegations against the 
prosecutor regarding his conduct in relation to the grand jury indictment process, obtaining a 
warrant, and the press). 
 114. See id. at 1066 ("Spiers moves to dismiss the allegations against him on the ground 
that his actions are protected by absolute, or alternatively, qualified immunity."). 
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before the grand jury.115  However, the court found that allegations three 
and four were not protected by absolute immunity because the traditional 
notions of advocacy did not encompass contacting the local newspaper and 
giving them the result of his investigation—whether true or false.116
Further, the court ruled that absolute immunity was not created to cover 
instances where the prosecutor would encourage or conspire with police 
officers to give false117 statements in their affidavits to secure an arrest 
warrant against the plaintiff.118
The district court granted in part the motion to dismiss on the first two 
allegations in the complaint, but denied in part the dismissal on the 
allegations pertaining to the defendant’s use of the print media and false 
statements from police officers to secure his indictment.119  The court 
concluded that the defendant was not cloaked with the garment of absolute 
immunity when he performed these acts.120
Both absolute and qualified immunity can be double-edged swords 
that can have the potential of maiming even wrongfully accused or 
imprisoned law enforcement officers.  In Brown v. Lyford,121  a former 
police sergeant filed a § 1983 action against some of his fellow police 
officers and a prosecutor pro tempore—all of whom  were engaged in a 
case involving children who were tortured, molested, and sodomized.122
During the prosecutor’s investigation, the plaintiff was investigating the 
disappearance of a seventeen year old girl.123  The plaintiff learned that one 
                                                                                                                 
 115. See id. at 1067–68 (determining that the prosecutor should receive absolute 
immunity for his actions concerning the grand jury as a result of its relationship to his role as 
prosecutor). 
 116. See id. at 1068 ("[C]ontacts with the press are definitely not within the traditional 
advocacy function of a prosecutor and therefore not protected by absolute immunity."). 
 117. See Jennifer Hewlett, Attorneys in Hit-and-Run that Killed Lexington Police 
Officer File Motion for Dismissal, LEXINGTON-HERALD-LEADER, Nov. 6, 2010 (describing 
the motion filed by defense attorneys for a man accused of murder requesting dismissal of 
the indictment against their client because the prosecutor intentionally presented the 
testimony of the lead detective to the grand jury, knowing that his testimony was false). 
 118. See Miller v. Spiers, 434 F. Supp. 2d 1064, 1068 (D. N. M. 2006) (finding that use 
of a false arrest warrant and complaint failed to fall under the absolute immunity shield). 
 119. See id. at 1068–69 (finding that the prosecutor should receive absolute immunity 
for his dealings with the grand jury, but not for his actions towards the press and his use of a 
warrant without probable cause). 
 120. Id. at 1069. 
 121. Brown v. Lyford, 243 F.3d 185 (5th Cir. 2001). 
 122. See id. at 187 (describing the incidents of abuse in the § 1983 complaint and the 
parties involved). 
 123. See id. at 188 (noting that Brown was involved in investigating a missing 
354 17 WASH. & LEE J.C.R. & SOC. JUST. 333 (2011)
of the children in the child abuse case stated that the missing seventeen-
year-old was also a victim in the instant child abuse investigation.124  The 
plaintiff disagreed with the child’s statement because he had been involved 
in the child abuse case and discovered that one of the key suspects in the 
child abuse case was not in the state at the time the seventeen-year-old 
victim was reported missing.125
Not long after making this statement, the child implicated the plaintiff 
and other suspects not only in the disappearance of the seventeen-year-old 
child, but also in the child abuse case that the defendants were presently 
investigating.126  The entire investigation was aborted and the plaintiff and 
the other original suspects in the child abuse case brought a separate § 1983 
action against the prosecutor and the investigating officers.127  The district 
court dismissed the complaint based on qualified immunity,128 finding that 
there was probable cause to arrest the plaintiff.129  The plaintiff was 
unsuccessful130 in overcoming the qualified immunity defense posed by the 
defendants.131  The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit 
agreed because the prosecutor acted within his usual judicial functions.132
                                                                                                                 
seventeen year old girl). 
 124. See id. ("In 1993, one of the Kerr children, identified as ‘R.S.,’ claimed that [the 
seventeen year old girl] had been abducted, raped, and murdered by the Kerrs."). 
 125. See id. ("Brown said he had separately investigated the Kerr and Hicks children’s 
allegations, and observed that Wendell Kerr, a key suspect, was not in Texas when Kelly 
Wilson disappeared."). 
 126. See id. ("R.S. implicated Brown in the charges of child abuse and the 
disappearance of Kelly Wilson."). 
 127. See id. at 187 (describing the § 1983 lawsuit that arose after the investigation 
ceased). 
 128. See Kerr v. Lyford, 171 F.3d 330, 338 (5th Cir. 1999) (determining that the district 
attorney’s investigatory activities merited qualified rather than absolute immunity). 
 129. See Brown v. Lyford, 243 F.3d 185, 189–91 (5th Cir. 2001) (reasoning that 
probable cause is a prerequisite for the type of qualified immunity granted by the district 
court). 
 130. See Gibson v. Rich, 44 F.3d 274, 277 (5th Cir. 1995) (observing that the qualified 
immunity doctrine not only provides protection from damages for the targeted government 
official, but is a means of avoiding judicial scrutiny from the lawsuit itself); see also Spann 
v. Rainey, 987 F.2d 1110, 1114 (5th Cir. 1993) ("Qualified immunity protects against being 
subjected to litigation and against liability.").  
 131. See Brown, 243 F.3d at 191 (finding that in regard to their investigative functions, 
Brown "was entitled to the same qualified immunity that protects Goar, Minshew, Flieg, and 
Baggs"). 
 132. See id. (stating that the prosecutor was entitled to qualified immunity for his 
investigative arts). 
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The resounding theme behind all of the above mentioned 
jurisprudence, along with thousands of other cases dealing with 
prosecutorial misconduct, has been that prosecutors need the freedom to 
perform their duties without the threat of a civil lawsuit lingering over their 
heads. 133 The complaints have been instances where prosecutors have 
coincidentally lost or have forgotten to inform defense attorneys that there 
is evidence that favors the defendant’s claim of innocence.134  On the other 
hand, prosecutorial misconduct does not include instances where the 
prosecutor zealously argues to the jury or before the media that the 
defendant is overwhelmingly guilty.  Prosecutors who are discourteous to 
the defendant’s family or who play mental chess games with defense 
attorneys to persuade the defendant to enter a guilty plea are not part of the 
immunity discussion.135
Peter Henning stated it best when he said that prosecutors hold a 
special136 place in the criminal justice process because whereas the 
prosecutor has a continuing duty to refrain from acting in an independent 
and unethical manner, the Model Rules of Professional Conduct provide no 
oversight or guidance with which to discern whether their conduct is 
acceptable zealous advocacy.137  Far too often  the federal Constitution and 
                                                                                                                 
 133. See Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88–89 (1935) (stating that the 
prosecutor’s obligation in any criminal case is to seek justice and not just another 
conviction).  However, the court went on to say that when the government crosses the line 
between proper and improper methods, prosecutorial misconduct occurs.  Id.; see also
Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 428–29 (1976) ("We emphasize that the immunity of 
prosecutors from liability in suits under § 1983 does not leave the public powerless to deter 
misconduct or to punish that which occurs."). 
 134. See Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51, 58 (1988) (describing the failure of 
police to preserve evidence by refrigerating and performing tests on clothing containing 
semen stains); see also United States v. Navarro, 608 F.3d 529, 532 (9th Cir. 2010) 
(evaluating a claim that the prosecutor misled the jury by misstating the law of duress). 
 135. See Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 181 (1986) (stating that the standard of 
review turned on whether the level of unfairness in the trial affected due process rather than 
undesirable remarks on the part of the prosecutor); see also United States v. Cornett, 232 
F.3d 570, 575–76 (7th Cir. 2000) (determining that the prosecutor’s improper vouching for 
witnesses was harmless and did not prejudice the defendant). 
 136. See Brady v. United States, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963) (demonstrating that it was the 
prosecutor’s role as an advocate for justice that prompted the United States Supreme Court 
in Brady to insist that a prosecutor disclose exculpatory evidence in its possession that is 
both material and favorable to the accused regarding either guilt or punishment). 
 137. See Peter Henning, Prosecutorial Misconduct and Constitutional Remedies, 77 
WASH. U. L.Q. 713, 727 (1999) (commenting that despite the fact that ethical rules impose a 
greater obligation than mere zealous representation onto prosecutors, "the codes do not 
furnish any guidance about what that means or even whose perspective determines whether a 
particular result was just"). 
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the pertinent jurisprudence  provide only suggestions for the government’s 
attorney to consider while prosecuting defendants. 
In almost the same context as stating that a prosecutor’s objective is to 
ensure that justice is given, the Berger court held that the government’s 
attorney may strike as many hard blows as constitutionally permissible 
while avoiding foul ones; so long as the prosecutor is using every legitimate 
means to secure a conviction.138 Confusing?  Absolutely.  This is the type of 
double talk that the general public finds frustrating in the legal profession.  
Vigorous representation of one’s client is a thread that is deeply woven into 
the fabric of every course in a law school’s curriculum.   But being vigilant, 
thorough, and unyielding while advocating for a client’s interests does have 
constitutional limits. 139
Given the limitless authority of prosecutors, the judiciary does not 
promote the pursuit for justice when it allows or even ignores prosecutors 
who, for the sole purpose of getting a conviction, hide favorable evidence 
from the defendant, use illegal tactics to obtain admissible evidence140 or 
manipulate the jury’s impartiality by exploiting the jurors’ prejudices.141
During his tenure as Attorney General in 1940, Robert Jackson stated that 
"[w]hile the prosecutor at his best is one of the most [beneficial] forces in 
our society, when he acts from malice or other base motives, he is one of 
the worst."142  Jackson also stated that it is the federal prosecutor who "has 
more control over life, liberty, and reputation than any other person in 
America."143
So, should the validity of the defendant’s conviction—in our 
introduction—hinge on Kenneth’s undisclosed relationship which he 
                                                                                                                 
 138. See id. at 729 ("[T]he Court noted the prosecutor’s duty to strike ‘hard blows,’ 
while avoiding ‘foul ones,’ and stated that the government’s attorney may ‘use every 
legitimate means’ to secure a conviction."). 
 139. See Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 429 (1976) (discussing that though 
immunity protected prosecutors from civil liability, they could still be held accountable for 
constitutional and criminal law violations). 
 140. See Washington v. Hofbauer, 228 F.3d 689, 699–700 (6th Cir. 2000) (finding that 
while the prosecutor engaged in severe misconduct by implying to jurors they could consider 
character evidence, it was not prejudicial to the defendant). 
 141. See United States v. Sandoval-Gomex, 295 F.3d 757, 762–63 (7th Cir. 2002) 
(determining that although the prosecutor made improper remarks by implying that the 
defendant did not understand the concept of deportation, it failed to prejudice the defendant 
enough to constitute a plain error). 
 142. Robert H. Jackson, The Federal Prosecutor, 24 J. AM. JUDICATURE SOC’Y 18, 18 
(1940). 
 143. See id. (speaking before a meeting of federal prosecutors). 
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exploited to secure the murder conviction?144  The United States Supreme 
Court apparently believes that a defendant who has been wrongfully 
imprisoned as a result of a prosecutor’s blatant refusal to comply with 
notions of professionalism and ethical representation can still have 
sufficient redress of his claim through other safeguards like professional 
discipline. 
Kenneth’s actions not only damaged his title as a minister of justice,145
but he also, indirectly, manipulated the jury by pressuring it to convict the 
defendant for murder.  There must be something more that defendants can 
do to deter these rogue prosecutors from randomly violating the general 
public.146  But the first order of business for the legal community should be 
to have prosecutors reverence their position as ministers of justice because 
the public is not going to expect anything less than what their title 
communicates.  Realistically, the problem with reigning in prosecutors for 
their unprofessional behavior is that no one generally wants to do it.147  The 
bar associations do not want to micro-manage the prosecutor’s office, and 
legal scholars believe that the federal Constitution and the statutes148 which 
have shielded prosecutors for centuries, are simply too massive to 
                                                                                                                 
 144. See generally, Alafair S. Burke, Revisiting Prosecutorial Disclosure, 84 IND. L.J.
481 (2009) (proposing a prophylactic open file rule in order to expand defendants’ federal 
constitutional rights to discovery). 
 145. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.8 (suggesting that prosecutors enjoy 
the classification of being ministers of justice and not simply that of advocates); see
generally, Randall Grometstein, Prosecutorial Misconduct and Noble-Cause Corruption, 43 
CRIM. L. BULL., No. 1, ART I (2007), [hereinafter Noble-Cause Corruption]. 
 146. The prosecutorial abuse that is referenced in this Article does not involve a 
prosecutor’s actions in giving false or incorrect information about the defendant during 
his/her investigation or for actions that involve the prosecutor not alerting witnesses about 
the consequences of testifying in a criminal trial; see Hart v. O’Brien, 127 F.3d 424, 432–33 
(5th Cir. 1997) (examining allegations that a district attorney used false information to 
obtain a search and arrest warrant); see also Ying Jing Gan v. City of New York, 996 F.2d 
522, 534–35 (2d Cir. 1993) (evaluating a complaint against a prosecutor for providing 
insufficient protection to a witness and failing to inform the witness of the dangers of face-
to-face identification); Barbera v. Smith, 836 F.2d 96, 101–02 (2d Cir. 1987) (dealing with a 
claim against a prosecutor for failing to provide adequate protection to a witness an 
revealing the witness’ identity to a suspect). 
 147. See Adam M. Gershowitz, Prosecutorial Shaming:  Naming Attorneys to Reduce 
Prosecutorial Misconduct, 42 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1059, 1062–63 (2009) (discussing the 
reluctance of appellate court judges to publicly censure district attorneys for prosecutorial 
misconduct). 
 148. See Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2671–2680 (2010) (limiting the tort 
liability of federal employees and preserving the right for federal employees to make 
defenses based on judicial or legislative immunity). 
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override.149  In other words, since the Constitution has purposefully given 
broad authority to prosecutors, then there remains no incentive 
whatsoever for prosecutors to change their policies.150
Although state disciplinary authorities frequently make lofty 
pronouncements about self-policing and the requirement that their 
attorneys conform to high standards of professionalism, the reality is that 
state authorities rarely151—if at all—discipline prosecutors for 
misconduct.152
More importantly, the United States Supreme Court’s decision in 
Van de Kamp v. Goldstein has given prosecutors a titanium-like outer 
shell that is virtually impregnable.153  The courts’ fear of penalizing 
prosecutors for their questionable/criminal behavior is that it does not 
want to restrain the prosecutor’s authority in a time when both Congress 
and the Office of the United States President are declaring war on crime 
and have assured the general public that criminals will be prosecuted to 
the fullest extent of the law.  For this reason, the nation’s district attorneys 
                                                                                                                 
 149. See generally, Martin A. Schwartz, Wrongful Conviction Claim Barred by 
Prosecutorial Immunity, N.Y. L.J., June 16, 2009, at col. 1 (stating that prosecutorial 
immunity can shield even blatantly unconstitutional conduct). 
 150. See Zacharias, supra note 94, at 103–04 (commenting that because the vague 
requirement to do justice is not often enforced, prosecutors have few reasons to conform 
their conduct to this standard). 
 151. See Eugene Volokh, Happy Birthday, Dear Murder Victim, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY
(Nov. 11, 2010, 2:45 PM), http://volokh.com/2010/11/11/happy-birthday-dear-murder-
victim/ [hereinafter Happy Birthday Case] (discussing a prosecutor’s decision to conclude 
her closing arguments to the jury by singing "Happy Birthday" to the deceased child-victim 
who was allegedly murdered by his defendant parents).  Although the majority of justices on 
the Georgia Supreme Court found the prosecutor’s behavior to be totally improper, it did not 
rule that the defendants’ convictions should be reversed because defense counsel did not 
object to the prosecutor’s theatrical performance.  Id.  On appeal, defense counsel argued 
that the stunt was so preposterous and he did not want to call any more attention to the 
performance by objecting.  Id.  He also argued that the prosecutor elected to do this stunt 
because the trial was being televised on Court TV.  Id.
 152. See Douglas J. McNamara, Buckley, Imbler and Stare Decisis:  The Present 
Predicament of Prosecutorial Immunity and an End to its Absolute Means, 59 ALB. L. REV.
1135, 1138 (1996) (suggesting that prosecutors should not have absolute immunity).  
"Although prosecutors need some protection from suit, absolute immunity is too much. . . .  
Discarding absolute prosecutorial immunity will only leave incompetent or malevolent 
prosecutors subject to civil liability for their misdeeds."  Id.
 153. See Van de Kamp v. Goldstein, 129 S. Ct. 855, 864–65 (2009) (finding that the 
supervisory prosecutors were "entitled to absolute immunity in respect to Goldstein’s claims 
that their supervision, training, or information-system management was constitutionally 
inadequate"). 
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lean heavily on their conviction rates as proof that their offices have been 
tough on crime154 during their political155 campaigns.156
PART II 
Convictions are First and Foremost 
Consider the factual circumstance in Pottawattamie County, Iowa v. 
McGhee157 in which two African-American teenagers were arrested and 
later convicted of first-degree murder in 1978 after the body of a retired 
police officer was discovered near a car dealership.  The officer’s body had 
a twelve-gauge shotgun wound to the chest, and the defendants were 
arrested a year later.158  The victim’s murder investigation took place during 
a heavy campaign season for the county attorney’s office.159  The county 
attorney, along with an assistant county attorney, made it the focal point of 
their political campaign to make an arrest with all deliberate speed.  Their 
objective was to show the community that their office was serious about 
                                                                                                                 
 154. See Malia N. Brink, A Pendulum Swung Too Far:  Why the Supreme Court Must 
Place Limits on Prosecutorial Immunity, 4 CHARLESTON L. REV. 1, 8–16 (2009) (describing 
the media and political pressures on prosecutors to win convictions).  Media coverage of 
criminal trials is nothing new, but the coverage has expanded from the sensational cases 
involving celebrities to a wide range of criminal cases that the public follows with great 
attention, thereby placing enormous pressure on prosecutors to quickly make an arrest and 
prosecute as soon as humanly possible.  Id.
 155. See Michael Scott Weiss, Public Defenders on Judges: A Qualitative Study of 
Perception and Motivation, 40 CRIM. L. BULL. 36, 41 (2004) [hereinafter Public Defenders 
on Judges] (describing the interviews the author had with current and former public 
defenders).  Many of the criminal court judges credit their posts as judges to their 
connections and not to their talents; in fact, these judges who hope to ascend to the appellate 
level will not be able to do so if the media as well as the general public gets the impression 
that they are soft on crime by indulging criminals or giving them a fair shake. Id.
 156. See Stephanos Bibas, Plea Bargaining Outside the Shadow of Trial, 117 HARV. L.
REV. 2463, 2472 (2004) (noting that "prosecutors are particularly concerned about their 
reputations because they are a politically ambitious bunch" and "many [prosecutors] have 
parlayed their prosecutorial successes into political careers"). 
 157. See McGhee v. Pottawattamie County, 547 F.3d 922, 933 (8th Cir. 2008), 
dismissed, 130 S. Ct. 1047 (2010) (finding that "immunity does not extend to the actions of a 
County Attorney who violates a person’s substantive due process rights by obtaining, 
manufacturing, coercing and fabricating evidence before filing formal charges, because this 
is not ‘a distinctly prosecutorial function’"). 
 158. See id. at 926 (describing the factual circumstances). 
 159. Id.
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protecting its citizens and that crime committed against first responders 
would be handled swiftly and with no mercy. 
Nothing in this murder investigation seem particularly disturbing until 
the facts reveal that both the county attorney and his assistant started 
interviewing witnesses and canvassing160 the neighborhoods for suspects 
like detectives.161  From these interviews, the men had more than twelve 
suspects who may have been responsible in the death of this retired 
officer.162  Further investigation revealed that the white brother-in-law of 
the captain of the local fire department was developed as a likely suspect to 
the murder.  Polygraph tests later revealed that the suspect’s answers were 
untruthful and that he was also a suspect in a 1963 murder in another 
state.163
Interestingly, the detectives/prosecutors continued their search for 
suspects and located an African-American teenager named Hughes, who 
had been arrested for stealing several cars from a dealership in Nebraska.164
While Hughes repeatedly denied having any knowledge of the retired 
officer’s murder, these ministers of justice165 continued to interrogate,166
induce, and threaten Hughes until he surrendered.  To say that Hughes was 
a habitual liar would be like referring to a person with an intelligence 
quotient of 185 as being "smart." 
Nevertheless, Hughes repeatedly lied about the identity of the 
murderers, failed polygraph tests, and admitted to lying to the police about 
his involvement in the retired officer’s murder.  These county prosecutors 
used Hughes as their star witness against two other African-American 
teenagers. The prosecutors continuously fed information to Hughes 
regarding critical facts about how the officer was killed. The United States 
                                                                                                                 
 160. See United States v. Scott, 223 F.3d 208, 209 (3d Cir. 2000) (stating that police 
officers canvassed a neighborhood and located a defendant who had evidence inadvertently 
hidden inside his clothing). 
 161. See Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 270 (1993) (regarding the prosecutor’s 
pre-indictment conspiracy with sheriff deputies to create false evidence against the plaintiff). 
 162. See McGhee, 547 F.3d at 926 ("In the investigation’s early stages, more than a 




 165. See Cox v. Hainey, 391 F.3d 25, 30–35 (1st Cir. 2004) (discussing prosecutorial 
immunity when advising law enforcement officials on the logistics of their actions). 
 166. See Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478, 496 (1991) (finding that a prosecutor’s legal 
advice to police may not be subjected to immunity because such actions may not fall under 
the judicial process category). 
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Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit found that the prosecutors’ behavior 
in this case was not covered under the absolute immunity umbrella because 
the defendants’ substantive due process rights were severely affected by the 
prosecutors’ act of obtaining, manufacturing, coercing, and fabricating 
evidence before filing criminal charges.167
The prosecutors/appellees immediately filed a writ of certiorari with 
the Supreme Court, hoping that the high court would unilaterally find that 
their decision to coerce and manipulate Hughes’ testimony before and 
during the trial fell within their prosecutorial discretion and thereby cover 
their deplorable acts with the cloak of absolute immunity.168  Defense 
attorneys from all over the country sat on the edge of their seats, waiting 
patiently to see how the Supreme Court would perform its legal gymnastics 
around qualified immunity and drench these prosecutors with absolute 
immunity.169  These officers acted as police officers, detectives, and 
prosecutors from the moment this retired officer’s body was found.  
Unfortunately, the case settled before the Supreme Court could render a 
decision in the matter, causing prosecutors in all fifty states to let out a sigh 
of relief.170
Randall Grometstein171 captured the full extent of this conundrum 
when he focused on the teleological reasoning (ends-oriented thinking) 
offered by many prosecutors when they are called to answer why their 
offices consistently abuse the constitutional rights of defendants.  Criminal 
justice professionals, like Grometstein, write that this mode of thinking is 
generally triggered either by sensational or notorious crimes or from moral 
panic. 
Many prosecutors and police officers subscribe to the crime-control 
model of the criminal justice system and thereby take a teleological 
view of the system.  Consequently, the noble cause of getting the "bad 
                                                                                                                 
 167. See McGhee v. Pottawattamie County, Iowa, 547 F.3d 922, 933 (8th Cir. 2008), 
dismissed, 130 S. Ct. 1047 (2010) (stating that immunity does not extend to the prosecutor’s 
actions that violated a person’s substantive due process rights before filing formal charges). 
 168. See Pottawattamie County v. McGhee, 129 S. Ct. 2002, 2002 (2009) (granting writ 
of certiorari). 
 169. See Margaret Z. Johns, Reconsidering Absolute Prosecutorial Immunity, 2005 
BYU L. REV. 53, 57 (2005) (noting that the "reconsideration of absolute prosecutorial 
immunity is especially urgent"). 
 170.  See Pottawattamie County v. McGhee, 130 S. Ct. 1047, 1047 (2010) ("The writ of 
certiorari in the above-entitled case was dismissed today pursuant to Rule 46 of the Rule of 
this Court."). 
 171. See Noble-Cause Corruption, supra note 145, at 66–67 (describing a teleologist). 
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guys" off the street justifies the occasional violations of due process that 
are necessary to accomplish that goal.172
In other words, prosecutors articulate to the masses that sometimes 
they have to break the law and do unethical and unconstitutional things to 
convict those people who broke the law.  Grometstein goes on to discuss 
Jocelyn M. Pollock’s view that prosecutors and law enforcement officials 
have an us v. them mentality depending on who is sitting at the defense 
table.173  Other notable scholars share in Pollock’s interpretation of today’s 
ever-evolving justice system. 
Anthropologists would not be surprised by the hypothesis that we reason 
deontologically (means-oriented)174 with respect to members of our own 
group and teleogically with respect to outsiders, especially those 
perceived to be dangerous.175
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court remains vigilant in its contention that 
placing a constitutional magnifying glass over the nation’s prosecutors and 
halting the criminal justice process every time a prosecutor steps offside, 
engages in unnecessary roughness, or commits some form of unethical 
behavior drastically affects the prosecutor’s effectiveness.176  It also 
undermines their authority to bring criminals to justice.  In other words, if 
the innocent are inadvertently grouped into a net filled with guilty criminals 
then those innocent people are simply classified as collateral damage177 by 
the courts and prosecutors alike.  Prosecutors fear that if they were to show 
leniency to those individuals whom the government had little to no 
                                                                                                                 
 172. Id. at 68. 
 173. See generally JOCELYN M. POLLOCK, ETHICS IN CRIME AND JUSTICE: DILEMMAS 
AND DECISIONS 148–149(Thompson Wadsworth 2004) (emphasizing the fierce loyalty 
within the group). 
 174. See In re Conduct of Burrows, 291 Or. 135, 143 (1981) (per curiam) (describing a 
prosecutor who was publicly reprimanded for talking to a represented defendant who 
expressed interest in entering a guilty plea on the pending charges in exchange for leniency 
on the sentence and a chance to do undercover work for the police and the prosecutor’s 
office in the future). 
 175. Gresham M. Sykes & David Matza, Techniques of Neutralization:  A Theory of 
Delinquency, 22 AM. SOC. REV. 664, 669 (1957). 
 176. See Catherine Ferguson-Gilbert, It Is Not Whether You Win or Lose, It Is How You 
Play the Game:  Is the Win-Loss Scorekeeping Mentality Doing Justice for Prosecutors?, 38 
CAL. W. L. REV. 283, 304 (2001) (stating that courts often "grant anonymity to prosecutors 
engaged in misconduct"). 
 177. See Prosecutorial Resistance, supra note 3, at 138 (noting the "psychological and 
personal barriers for prosecutors confronting post-conviction innocence claims"). 
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incriminating evidence against, then the public would paint them as being 
soft on crime, and this would mark them as politically deceased.
Legal scholars believe that sanctioning prosecutorial misconduct 
would place a chilling effect on a prosecutor’s trial decisions and could 
cause a public revolt against government attorneys.178  This Author 
subscribes to the notion that exposing prosecutorial misconduct to the 
public will not only reinvigorate the public’s confidence in the justice 
system, but exposing such misconduct will also deter other prosecutors 
from pursuing questionable trial practices in the future.179
More accountability through active judicial oversight will cause senior 
prosecutors to become fervent in monitoring their junior180 colleagues.  
They could also mandate that junior-level prosecutors attend appropriate 
training seminars sponsored by the nation’s district attorney associations.181
Unlike the situation with Kenneth, our lead prosecutor in the first part of 
this Article, junior-level prosecutors account for a majority of the 
prosecutorial misconduct cases, mainly because they are attempting to 
maximize professional gains by impressing the private-sector attorneys who 
are watching them in the audience.182
What would be the objective for Congress to enact a § 1983 remedy 
for its  citizens whose civil rights have been grieved if that person cannot 
hold the offending government employee financially responsible because  
other federal statutes  prevent such lawsuits?  While the federal judiciary is 
concentrated on not jeopardizing the prosecutor’s decision-making 
authority on issues that are intimately associated to the judicial phase of the 
criminal process,183 defense attorneys, on the other hand, have to contend 
                                                                                                                 
 178. See generally Lisa C. Harris, Note, Perjury Defeats Justice, 42 WAYNE L. REV.
1755, 1785 (1996) (discussing the loss of trust in the justice system after police misconduct 
was exposed in the Simpson trial). 
 179. See Drake v. Kemp, 762 F.2d 1449, 1461 (11th Cir. 1985) (finding that an 
improper prosecutorial argument rendered a sentencing proceeding fundamentally unfair). 
 180. See Dunahoe, supra note 18, at 64–67 (stating that the disadvantage with the 
bottom-up approach to prosecutorial misconduct is that the supervising attorney will not be 
deterred by such an approach and there will be no incentive to change the office’s internal 
structure to prevent future prosecutorial conduct). 
 181. Id.
 182. See Dunahoe, supra note 18, at 49 (arguing that "individual low-level prosecutors 
are responsible for a significant percentage of prosecutorial misconduct and, further, that 
these prosecutors seek primarily to maximize professional gains"). 
 183. See Van de Kamp v. Goldstein, 129 S. Ct. 855, 857 (2009) ("Prosecutors are 
absolutely immune from liability in § 1983 suits brought against prosecutorial actions that 
are ‘intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process’. . . ." (quoting 
Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 430 (1976))). 
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with disgruntled clients who have been convicted because the prosecutor 
ignored basic constitutional safeguards that ruined their clients’ reputations 
as well as their will to live.184
Hundreds of defense attorneys, during voir dire, have asked potential 
jurors this question:  "In your opinion, which one of these situations would 
be the greatest harm to society, for an innocent man to go to jail or for a 
guilty man to go free?"185  Many of the jurors in the hundreds of appeals 
that I have reviewed would say, without hesitating, that the greatest harm 
was for an innocent man to go to jail.  If this is the public’s notion of a 
grave injustice, then it stands to wonder why the judiciary seems to have an 
opposite view.  The fact that a prosecutor is engaged in representing the 
government in a criminal matter does necessarily give them a license to 
hide exculpatory186 evidence,187 to threatened witnesses against testifying 
for the defense, or to knowingly present false testimony188 or exhibits to 
secure a conviction. 
Catherine Ferguson-Gilbert gave a hypothetical in her Article on 
prosecutors that depicted this type of prosecutorial action as being 
unsportsmanlike athletes.189  Her description of government attorneys was 
very compelling.  Here is an excerpt from her analogy: 
Even if I do not play the game well, and I lie, cheat, and dishonor the 
game itself—I will face no consequences.  When I play the game 
unfairly, and even hurt innocent people in the process, others will label 
                                                                                                                 
 184. See Ellen Yaroshefsky, Wrongful Convictions:  It Is Time to Take Prosecution 
Discipline Seriously, 8 UDC L. REV. 275, 282 (2004) [hereinafter Prosecution Discipline]
(finding that the instances of prosecutorial misconduct are not benign mistakes, but are acts 
of "gross negligence or intentional acts" done under the misguided impression that these 
prosecutors were pursuing justice). 
 185. See Bruce A. Green & Ellen Yaroshefsky, Prosecutorial Discretion and Post-
Conviction Evidence of Innocence, 6 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 467, 497 (2009) [hereinafter 
Evidence of Innocence] (stating that "the fundamental question is whether an innocent 
person was wrongly convicted, not whether the defendant can be successfully retried"). 
 186. See In re Riehlmann, 891 So. 2d 1239, 1241 (describing the situation in which a 
former prosecutor told a current prosecutor about exculpatory evidence he had suppressed in 
a former case).  The current prosecutor (attorney)  was publicly reprimanded for not 
reporting the  conversation. Id.  The former prosecutor disclosed to the attorney that he had 
suppressed exculpatory blood evidence against a defendant. Id.  Moments before his startling 
confession, the former prosecutor told the attorney that he was dying from colon cancer. Id.
 187. See MICHAEL L. RADELET ET AL., IN SPITE OF INNOCENCE: ERRONEOUS 
CONVICTIONS IN CAPITAL CASES 290–91 (Northeastern University Press 1992)(describing 
instances where the presiding prosecutor suppressed exculpatory evidence from the defense). 
 188. See generally Fritz v. City of Ada, Oklahoma, Civ. No: 00-194 (E.D. Okla. 2000). 
 189. See Ferguson-Gilbert, supra note 176, at 283 (describing the author’s hypothetical 
of playing a "game"). 
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my actions as "harmless."  There is no recourse for my misconduct in 
my attempt to win190 the game.  I thus continue my pursuit of wins, but I 
am supposed to be "just."  I have a blindfold on, but if I take it off I can 
see the procedure I need to follow to be "just."  Who am I? I am. . . a 
prosecutor.191
Gilbert’s hypothetical is most appropriate for our discussion because 
even the prosecutors themselves rate their success using a "score keeping 
mentality" or a "batting average."192  Law enforcement agencies measure 
their prosecutors’ win-loss ratio by placing the names of each prosecutor on 
a board, with green stickers for wins and red stickers for losses.193
Interestingly, the Van de Kamp court was of the opinion that to allow a 
defendant, no matter how justified, to bring a civil rights action against the 
prosecutor’s office, would not only encourage other disgruntled defendants 
to follow along, but it would "pose substantial danger of liability even to 
the honest prosecutor."194  Does this sound strangely similar to the concerns 
most potential jurors have about innocent people going to jail? 
The overall purpose of the § 1983 civil rights action was to create an 
avenue of recovery195 for a citizen who had their civil rights violated. The 
only prerequisite to bringing such an action was to have the complainant 
demonstrate how he was deprived of a constitutional right by a person 
acting under color of law.196  Having a defendant lose their right to freedom 
because a government attorney violated one of the basic principles under 
our constitution seems to fall squarely within the province of the statute. 
                                                                                                                 
 190. See Prosecutorial Resistance, supra note 3, at 135–38 (stating that police officers 
look to the number of arrests made during any given month as evidence of their 
effectiveness, and consequently, district attorneys view their win-loss record as a symbol of 
their self-worth). 
 191. Ferguson-Gilbert, supra note 176, at 283. 
 192. See generally Elizabeth Glazer, Crime Busting and Crime Prevention:  A Dual 
Role for Prosecutors, CRIM. JUST. MAG., Winter 2001 ("Like most prosecutors, he viewed 
the individual case as the unit of measurement and the number of arrests or convictions as 
the measure of success."). 
 193. See Ferguson-Gilbert, supra note 176, at 290 ("Some prosecutors’ offices even 
measure wins and losses, next to each prosecutor’s name on a board, with green stickers for 
victories and red stickers for losses."). 
 194. Van de Kamp v. Goldstein, 129 S. Ct. 855, 858 (quoting Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 
U.S. 409, 425 (1976)). 
 195. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2010) (providing for a civil action for deprivation of rights).  
This provision is sometimes referred to as a Bivens claim, which is a suit "brought directly 
under the Constitution against federal officials."  Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 504 
(1978). 
 196. See Collins v. Womancare, 878 F.2d 1145, 1147 (9th Cir. 1989)  (arguing on 
appeal that Womancare did not act under color of state law). 
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The United States Supreme Court further interpreted this statute by 
stating that a person acts under color of law for purposes of 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1983 if he "exercise[s] power possessed by virtue of state law and the 
harm was  possible only because the wrongdoer was clothed with authority 
of state law."197  Generally speaking, all categories of government 
employees could expose their employers to a § 1983 suit—except for 
prosecutors who enjoy the protection of an invincible shield called absolute 
immunity. 
I am reminded of a conversation I had with a defense attorney 
regarding the possibility of piercing the absolute immunity shield.  She 
agreed that the immunity shield has protected prosecutors from being 
personally responsible for mistakes in judgment and their failures to comply 
with basic discovery requests.  However, she regretfully admitted that this 
form of immunity has created prosecutorial juggernauts who view the 
criminal courts as their personal playground where they own all the toys 
and get to make the decision on how the games should be played.  She also 
mentioned that if the federal courts were to allow defendants to maintain a 
§ 1983 action against federal and state prosecutors it should be for 
egregious conduct only.198
Initially, I agreed with her statement, but began to wonder, "how 
should egregious conduct be defined in criminal prosecutions?"  In fact, I 
begin to theorize what could be more egregious than for a person to spend 
months or even years199 in prison because his conviction resulted from a 
prosecutor’s desire to ignore basic federal criminal rules.200  Apparently, the 
United States Supreme Court does not share my contempt for prosecutorial 
excuses.  After all, simply reversing a defendant’s conviction is no longer 
                                                                                                                 
 197. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 49 (1988) (quoting United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 
299, 326 (1941)). 
 198. See Jackie Lu, How Terror Changed Justice:  A Call to Reform Safeguards that 
Protect Against Prosecutorial Misconduct, 14 J.L. & POL’Y 377, 385–86 (2006) ("Findings 
of egregious prosecutorial misconduct could warrant overturning a conviction."). 
 199. See Don Terry, Ex-Prosecutors and Deputies in Death Row Case are Charged 
with Framing Defendant, N.Y. TIMES, A18 Dec. 13, 1996 [hereinafter Ex-Prosecutors 
Charged] (reporting that three former prosecutors and four sheriff'’s deputies were charged 
with conspiracy, perjury, and obstruction of justice, resulting in two Hispanic men being 
released from prison after years on death row).  Three former Illinois County prosecutors 
and four sheriffs admitted to giving false testimony about important evidence that convicted 
the two men for the rape, abduction and murder of a ten-year-old girl in 1985.  Id.
 200. See Marshall J. Hartman & Stephen L. Richards, The Illinois Death Penalty:  What 
Went Wrong?, 34 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 409, 422–23 (2001) (noting that "the responsibility 
of insuring that a criminal defendant receives a fair trial lies, in heavy measure, upon the 
prosecutor"). 
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an option for the appellate courts because in Smith v. Phillips,201 the 
Supreme Court "undermined the effectiveness of appellate reversal202 as a 
sanction against offending prosecutors when it decided that the ‘touchstone 
of due process analysis is the fairness of the trial, not the culpability of the 
prosecutor.’"203
During the 1980s, it was virtually impossible to see a man or woman 
on primetime television wearing provocative clothing or using profanity.  
Now, provocative clothing and profanity are the norm.  Our culture has 
even developed animated television shows with men and women wearing 
provocative clothing, engaging in risqué bedroom scenes and using vulgar 
language.   Primetime news stations in the 1980s would not show people 
lying dead in the streets while broadcasting the many conflicts in the 
Middle East.  However, this is a new generation with a new set of rules. 
Our society has become desensitized to the jaw-dropping events that 
commonly happen in our criminal justice system.   Today, if a news station 
were to broadcast that a person was released from prison after serving over 
twenty-five years of incarceration because evidence was destroyed or 
misplaced by the prosecutor’s office, society would be outraged and it 
would protest against the prosecutor’s office for no more than a weekend.  
Yet, no one would actually be surprised that such a thing happened.  The 
inmate’s family and friends would certainly celebrate his release and 
applaud the fact that justice was finally received for their loved one. 
No more than three days after this breaking story, it would be business 
as usual in the criminal courts.  The prosecutor would shrug his shoulders 
for making the mistake, and the defense attorney would shake his head in 
disbelief, but the atmosphere in the courts would not change.  Surely, 
nothing could be more egregious than to have an innocent man or woman, 
spend years living in a cell no larger than a public restroom stall.  If a 
defense attorney were to manipulate or hide vital evidence from the State, 
there would not be any disagreement that he would face disciplinary and 
                                                                                                                 
 201. See Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 219 (1982) ("Past decisions of this Court 
demonstrate that the touchstone of due process analysis in cases of alleged prosecutorial 
misconduct is the fairness of the trial, not the culpability of the prosecutor."). 
 202. See Walter W. Steele, Jr., Unethical Prosecutors and Inadequate Discipline, 38 
SW. L.J. 965, 976 (1984) (stating that reversing convictions as a sanction to prosecutors who 
used unconstitutional tactics will not act as a deterrent to prosecutors even though they may 
be somewhat beneficial to defendants). 
 203. Prosecutorial Subordination, supra note 17, at 262 (quoting Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 
83, 87 (1963)). 
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perhaps criminal penalties for obstruction of justice.204  The same would not 
be true for prosecutors.205
An argument can be made that prosecutors should not be held 
accountable for a defendant’s conviction when it was the defendant’s own 
trial counsel who overlooked the exculpatory evidence.206  These sorts of 
claims have generously been lodged against public defenders at both the 
state and federal levels.  Public defenders have routinely been applauded for 
their efforts in upholding their duties and responsibilities while representing 
indigent defendants in the criminal courts.  The legal community is well 
aware that public defenders lack the financial resources to compete against 
the massive resources available to state and/or federal governments.207
Naturally, the financial resources of the government dwarfs the budget of 
any public defender’s office—even in a recession period like the one this 
country is presently experiencing.  Nevertheless, this fact should not 
depreciate the value of giving a defendant his right to a fair and impartial 
trial.208
Hiring medical experts to support a defendant’s unique and perhaps 
novel defense is genuinely not an option that public defenders have.209
                                                                                                                 
 204. See generally Laurel Fedder, Obstacles to Maintaining the Integrity of the 
Profession:  Rule 8.3’s Ambiguity and Disciplinary Board Complacency, 23 GEO. J. LEGAL 
ETHICS 571, 571 (2010) (stating that "those licensed to practice law pledge to abide by 
certain rules and regulations promulgated to ensure that the legal system functions 
properly").  One legal scholar reviewed statistical data from the disciplinary board in the 
State of Texas, and learned that in 2008, the agency received over 7,000 complaints of 
attorney misconduct, but investigated less than twenty-five percent of those complaints.  Id.
at 580.  If seventy-five percent of the complaints for attorney misconduct were dismissed, 
imagine the statistical data for prosecutorial misconduct where there is federal judicial 
precedence authorizing prosecutors to use unconstitutional tactics as ministers of justice.  Id.
 205. See Prosecution Discipline, supra note 184, at 282–83 (declaring that "[i]f 
disciplinary authorities severely punish lawyers who steal money from clients, it behooves 
our justice system to at least consider discipline of lawyers, who, intentionally or through 
gross negligence, steal years of a person’s life and distort our justice system"). 
 206. See Kelly v. Curtis, 21 F.3d 1544, 1556 (11th Cir. 1994) (declaring that the police, 
not the prosecutor should be held civilly liable for hiding or not revealing exculpatory 
evidence). 
 207. See Rebecca Marcus, Note, Racism in Our Courts:  The Underfunding of Public 
Defenders and Its Disproportionate Impact upon Racial Minorities, 22 HASTINGS CONST.
L.Q. 219, 223 (1994) (noting the "combination of increasingly meager resources and soaring 
caseloads"). 
 208. See id. at 228 ("The financial support given to public defenders’ offices is simply 
insufficient to provide the truly effective assistance of counsel as mandated by the 
Constitution."). 
 209. See id. at 228–29 (stating that the total expenditures for the criminal justice system 
display an inequity in the distribution of resources, particularly for public defense). 
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These defenders have at least three hundred cases assigned to them and 
many of them can hardly recall the names of their clients correctly let alone 
the specific facts and circumstances of their cases.210  Ridicules and a host 
of criticism are the dark clouds that hover over public defenders and given 
their large caseloads, it is not unusual for any of them to overlook a 
Brady211 issue or not to pursue a specific argument that is buried in a police 
report or a drug analysis report.212  Again, this does not give prosecutors a 
license to take advantage213 of an unsuspecting defense attorney or public 
defender.214
Canvassing a typical criminal court, one will automatically notice one 
central theme—chaos. In fact, to say that the criminal court setting is 
chaotic is an understatement.  The prosecutors are calling out the cases on 
the docket, while several private defense attorneys are talking to their 
incarcerated clients who are seated in the jury box or behind a protective 
glass located in the courtroom.  The judge’s minute clerk is calling out the 
available dates for status conferences and trials, and the public defender is 
quickly trying to get a gist of his client’s case before the judge asks, "how 
does your client wish to plea?" 
The function of a prosecutor and that of a defense attorney is uniquely 
different.  Unlike the prosecutor, the defense attorney’s obligation is to 
guarantee that his client receives a fair and speedy trial.  Sometimes this 
obligation incorporates keeping certain evidence from being introduced or 
certain witnesses from testifying so that he can secure the best possible 
outcome for his client, which is generally an acquittal.215
                                                                                                                 
 210. See id. at 230 ("Some [public defenders] even say they feel they are violating their 
clients’ constitutional rights because they are unable to spend the time or resources that they 
believe their client’s cases merit."). 
 211. See Alafair S. Burke, Revisiting Prosecutorial Disclosure, 84 IND. L.J. 481, 481 
(2009) [hereinafter Revisiting Disclosure] (noting the "increased attention to the 
prosecutorial suppression of material exculpatory evidence"). 
 212. See Marcus, supra note 207, at 230 (stating that prosecutors have "free" access to 
lab work while defense programs must pay for it from their own budget). 
 213. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 8.3(a), 8.4(c) (2007) (imposing on all 
attorneys the obligation to not only report unprofessional conduct, but to also refrain from 
engaging in conduct involving deceit, dishonesty, fraud and misrepresentation). 
 214. See Laurence A. Benner, The Presumption of Guilt:  Systemic Factors that 
Contribute to Ineffective Assistance of Counsel in California, 45 CAL. W. L. REV. 263, 309 
(2009) (discussing the significant disparities in resources allocated to the prosecution and the 
defense, resulting in excessive workloads in defender offices). 
 215. See JOSEPH F. LAWLESS, JR., PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT 23 (Matthew Bender & 
Co., 2d ed. 1999) (1985) (describing the function of the prosecutor and how it may have 
changed from being "champions of justice to advocates of victory"). 
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The immense power harnessed by prosecutors has caused many of 
them to blur the lines between seeking justice and opposing their 
adversary.216  One legal scholar eloquently stated: 
Prosecutors’ unethical trial conduct is too common and too destructive 
to ignore.  Any amount of misconduct by a prosecutor is intolerable 
because of the unique and powerful position he plays in the criminal 
justice system.  Frequent misconduct is subversive to the perception that 
the American legal profession is capable of self-policing professional 
standards.217
Some prosecutors begin to rationalize the relevance of the exculpatory 
evidence they uncover during their investigation.  They call witnesses that 
they know will give false testimony, but they do not find such action to be 
suborning perjury.218  The American judicial system has been transformed 
from a quest for justice to an everyday wrestling match with the ultimate 
goal being to get a conviction.219
Because of the usually busy atmosphere of the criminal court system it 
is especially egregious for a prosecutor to take advantage of their authority 
and power by manipulating, hiding, or manufacturing evidence against the 
defendant.220  Being a minister of justice denotes a sense of nobility and 
honor.  The interests of the general public as well as the victims’ interests 
and that of their families fall within the prosecutor’s discretion and control.  
Therefore, any misconduct committed by a prosecutor while engaged in 
their prosecutorial function creates a negative perception before the public 
that can hardly be erased.221  Jurists find it extremely difficult to sanction 
                                                                                                                 
 216. See Ex-Prosecutors Charged, supra note 199, at A18 (quoting a special prosecutor 
that "there must always be a line between vigorous prosecution and official misconduct, 
between advocacy and unfairness, and between justice and injustice . . . [t]his indictment 
charges that [the] line was crossed by seven people"). 
 217. Steele, Jr., supra note 202, at 979. 
 218. See Revisiting Disclosure, supra note 211, at 499 ("Prosecutors seeking to do 
justice may also feel obligated to use every legally permissible maneuver to convict a 
defendant they believe is guilty, and therefore will not necessarily dissolve exculpatory 
evidence to the defense if they believe the evidence is immaterial."). 
 219. See H. Richard Uviller, The Neutral Prosecutor:  The Obligation of Dispassion in 
a Passionate Pursuit, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 1695, 1697 (2000) (arguing that the legal 
community and society as a whole has "imposed fundamentally inconsistent obligations 
on . . . prosecutors, bending them into psychological pretzels by requiring them to be the 
neutral investigators and the ‘quasi-judicial’ adjudicator while at the same time imagining 
themselves as the zealous courtroom advocate"). 
 220. See generally Fred C. Zacharias, The Professional Discipline of Prosecutors, 79 
N.C. L. REV. 721, 732 (2001) (providing a table of the stages of prosecutorial misconduct). 
 221. See In re Riehlmann, 891 So. 2d 1239, 1245 (La. 2005) (stating that the attorney 
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prosecutors because they are familiar with the prosecutor and are reluctant 
to speak ill222 of someone of whom they have shared personal, academic, or 
professional experiences. 223
As an appellate attorney in both state and federal courts in the State of 
Louisiana, I know the awkwardness of my conversations with my clients 
when I attempt to explain to them why a prosecutor’s constitutional 
misjudgments does not automatically result in a new trial or a reversal224 of 
their conviction.225  As I discuss the harmless error rule, I feel that I have 
somehow betrayed226 their trust since the harmless error doctrine permits 
prosecutors to trample227 over the rules of criminal procedure with no 
criminal or civil repercussions.  Academicians228 have repeatedly 
                                                                                                                 
was publicly reprimanded for not disclosing that a former prosecutor had suppressed 
exculpatory blood evidence until five years later when the affected defendant was scheduled 
to be executed). 
 222. See Adam M. Gershowitz, Prosecutorial Shaming:  Naming Attorneys to Reduce 
Prosecutorial Misconduct, 42 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1059, 1067 (2009) (noting that courts 
often go out of their way to avoid publicizing the names of prosecutors, as in United States 
v. Kojayan, 8 F.3d 1315 (9th Cir. 1993)). 
 223. See Deborah Sontag, The Power of the Fourth, N. Y. TIMES, Mar. 9, 2003 38 
(Magazine), available at http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9F00EFDA17 
31F93AA35750C0A9659C8B63 (last visited Jan. 22, 2011) (stating that it is common 
practice for the judges of the Fourth Circuit to descend from the bench to shake the hands of 
the advocates following each argument) (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of 
Civil Rights and Social Justice). 
 224. See Evidence of Innocence, supra note 185, at 507 (discussing how convinced a 
prosecutor must be of a defendant’s innocence to rectify an apparent injustice through 
available judicial or executive processes). 
 225. See James Edwards Wicht, III, There is No Such Thing as a Harmless 
Constitutional Error:  Returning To A Rule of Automatic Reversal, 12 BYU J. PUB. L. 73, 73 
(1997) (discussing the subjective nature of the harmless error rule, which was created to 
prevent the setting aside of convictions for small errors that did not affect the parties’ 
substantial rights). 
 226. Prosecutorial corruption apparently is not limited to U. S. borders.  See Editorial, 
Clarifying the Betrayal of Trust, JAPAN TIMES,  Oct. 5, 2010, available at
http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/ed20101005a1.html (last visited Jan. 20, 2011) 
(discussing the corruption present in the Japanese public prosecutor’s office) (on file with 
the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice). 
 227. Contrast this view with a situation where the prosecutor learns of new evidence 
that casts doubt on a convicted defendant’s guilt as opposed to actually withholding the 
exculpatory evidence from defense counsel or surrendering information that trial jurors may 
have considered extra-record evidence during its deliberations. See EVIDENCE OF INNOCENCE,
supra note 128, at 474 (discussing the manner in which prosecutors should respond when 
new evidence casts doubt on the guilt of a defendant). 
 228. See generally, Alan Hirsch, Confession and Harmless Error:  A New Argument for 
the Old Approach, 12 BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 1, 2 (2007) (favoring a return to automatic 
reversal). 
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questioned the legitimacy of the harmless error rule because defense 
attorneys who commit the same serious constitutional violations receive 
an entirely different result.229
A defendant’s right to counsel, right to a trial by jury,230 right to 
compulsory process, and right to cross-examination231 were originally 
intended to minimize the risk that an innocent person would be 
punished.232   But the purpose of the Sixth Amendment is somehow lost 
in the translation when the public realizes that federal prosecutors who 
enjoy the authority to charge individuals with crimes can also distort the 
outcome of the criminal process—all with the court’s blessings. 
The courts and legal scholars concur that a prosecutor who would 
resort to using such tactics defaces the criminal justice process.  While 
there may be no dispute that the prosecutor’s actions are despicable, it is 
highly unlikely that the prosecutor would ever face any criminal, civil, or 
disciplinary sanctions for his behavior. 
Unfortunately, the resounding problems with imposing civil 
penalties against prosecutors resides with those elected officials (i.e. 
judges), who are entrusted with the obligation of insuring that justice is 
served.233  These jurists are hesitant234 to hold these rogue prosecutors 
                                                                                                                 
 229. See JIM DWYER, PETER NEUFELD & BARRY SCHECK, ACTUAL INNOCENCE: FIVE 
DAYS TO EXECUTION AND OTHER DISPATCHES FROM THE WRONGLY CONVICTED 175 (2000) 
(declaring that harmless error is a sham, resulting in a scenario in which most prosecutors 
are not disciplined for their misconduct). 
 230. See L.A. CONST. art. I, § 17; see also Todd E. Pettys, Counsel and Confrontation,
94 MINN. L. REV. 201, 201 (2009) (discussing the Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause 
and a defendant’s right to cross-examination of a hearsay declarant). 
 231. John R. Kroger, The Confrontation Waiver Rule, 78 B.U. L. Rev. 835 (1996). 
 232. See Evidence of Innocence, supra note 185, at  482, (citing Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 
570, 577–78 (1986) (declaring that these rights are essential for the trier of fact to reach a 
determination of guilt or innocence). 
 233. On December 9, 2010, the United States Senate convicted U.S. District Judge G. 
Thomas Porteous for maintaining a corrupt relationship with a local bail bondsman, 
accepting gifts from lawyers and friends to pay gambling debts, and committing perjury 
during the appointment process.  Former Judge Porteous was the eighth federal district judge 
to be removed through the impeachment process.  See Michael A. Memoli, Senate Convicts 
Federal Judge; G. Thomas Porteous of  Louisiana  is Found Guilty of Corruption and 
Perjury, LOS ANGELES TIMES, Dec. 9, 2010, at A12, available at http://articles. 
latimes.com/2010/dec/09/nation/la-na-porteous-impeach-20101209 (last visited Feb. 1, 
2011) (reporting on the conviction of Judge Porteous for corruption and perjury charges) (on 
file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice). 
 234. See Walter W. Steele, Jr., Unethical Prosecutors and Inadequate Discipline, 38 
SW. L.J. 964, 972 (1984) [hereinafter Unethical Prosecutors] ("Frequently, the assignment 
of a prosecutor to one particular judge can lead to a team-member kind of rapport between a 
judge and ‘his’ prosecutor, a fact that facilitates violations of DR 7-110."). 
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accountable.235   In fact, finding a judge who would be willing to 
jeopardize236 his tenure for the sake of having a prosecutor publicly 
reprimanded would be as hard as finding a solution to the national debt 
crisis.237
Assuming arguendo that there is a judge who is willing to delve into 
the prosecutor’s decision-making policies in a particular criminal case, the 
Supreme Court would make it virtually impossible for the affected parties 
to conduct the necessary discovery to support a request for judicial review 
of the misconduct.238  There are no substantive regulations to guide or 
correct the prosecutor’s behavior.239  The defendants are too intimidated to 
pursue an action against the prosecutor’s office for fear that they may be 
life-long criminal targets in future investigations.  The courts have built a 
fortress around the evidence that supports240 claims of prosecutorial 
misconduct and have called it work product.241   On those rare occasions 
                                                                                                                 
 235. Judges are less likely to sanction or even confront prosecutors for their misconduct 
out of fear that they would suffer politically or could themselves become targets of the all 
powerful prosecutor’s office.  See, e.g., Edward M. Genson & Mark W. Martin, The 
Epidemic of Prosecutorial Courtroom Misconduct in Illinois:  Is It Time to Start Prosecuting 
the Prosecutors? 19 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 39, 47 (1987) ("Disciplinary sanctions are rarely 
imposed against prosecutors."). 
 236. A study that interviewed several public defenders about their positions have 
described the criminal judges that they have been exposed to in their practice as ex-
prosecutors with an exclusive prosecutorial background who also viewed themselves as 
members of the law enforcement community.  See Michael Scott Weiss, Public Defenders 
on Judges: A Qualitative Study of Perception and Motivation. 40 CRIM. L. BULL., No. 1, 
ART 2 (2004), [hereinafter Public Defenders on Judges]. 
 237. However, there was a dissenting opinion issued in the case where the prosecutor 
brought a birthday cake into the courtroom, placed it in front of the jury, lit the candles and 
sung Happy Birthday to the murdered victim.  The dissent called for the convictions to be 
reversed.  See Happy Birthday Case, supra note 151. 
 238. See Angela J. Davis, The Legal Profession’s Failure to Discipline Unethical 
Prosecutors, 36 HOFSTRA L. REV. 275, 281 (2007) [hereinafter Unethical Prosecutors]
(noting that the Supreme Court has set nearly impossible standards for obtaining the 
necessary discovery to seek judicial review of certain types of prosecutorial misconduct). 
 239. The title ministers of justice "carries with it the specific obligation to see that the 
defendant is accorded procedural justice and that guilt is decided upon the basis of sufficient 
evidence. Precisely how far the prosecutor is required to go in this direction is a matter of 
debate and varies in different jurisdictions. " See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.8 
cmt. 1 (2007); see also Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 89 (1935) (reversing the 
defendant’s prior conviction due to prosecutorial misconduct). 
 240. See Joe Palazzolo & Mike Scarcella, Losing Integrity:  How Justice Fumbled Its 
Case Against Ted Stevens, LEGAL TIMES, Apr. 6, 2009, at 1 (laying out a timeline of events 
for the Stevens prosecution). 
 241. See ANGELA J. DAVIS, ARBITRARY JUSTICE: THE POWER OF THE AMERICAN 
PROSECUTOR 123 41 (2007) (examining the breadth of prosecutorial misconduct and the 
374 17 WASH. & LEE J.C.R. & SOC. JUST. 333 (2011)
where judicial review is permitted, the courts often issue decisions 
affirming the prosecutor’s behavior by using the doctrines of harmless 
error and absolute immunity.242  In fact, the Supreme Court noted that in 
the absence of procedural error, the defendant’s only remedy for being 
wrongfully convicted was to submit a petition for executive clemency.243
With so many safeguards in place to shield prosecutors from public 
scrutiny, it is surprising that there are not more cases of defendants who 
have been wrongfully convicted.  As the prosecutor’s trial tactics become 
harsher and ruthless, the judiciary and the disciplinary boards become more 
helpless.  Each one hoping that the  other would be courageous enough to 
put on the armor of justice and confront this modern-day Goliath about their 
reprehensible behavior.244  Unfortunately, neither party is willing to take 
any meaningful action towards stopping prosecutors from raping justice at 
will.245
In the past, the courts have voiced disapproval of a prosecutor’s 
unethical tactics by issuing contempt citations, imposing fees, and 
costs, or criticizing246 prosecutors in its opinions, but these methods of 
judicial discipline were the equivalent of throwing rocks at a battle 
tank.247
                                                                                                                 
reasons why prosecutors often escape punishment). 
 242. See Ellen Yaroshefsky, Wrongful Convictions:  It Is Time to Take Prosecution 
Discipline Seriously, 8 U.D.C. L. REV. 275, 276–77 (2004)  [hereinafter Prosecution 
Discipline] (stating that the discipline for prosecutors is rare and that there are few, if any, 
consequences for prosecutorial misconduct) (quoting DEBORAH RHODE, IN THE INTEREST OF 
JUSTICE 160 61 (2000)). 
 243. See Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 416 17 (1993) (discussing executive 
clemency as a remedy for claims of innocence based upon the discovery of new evidence); 
see, e.g., Moeller v. Weber, 689 N.W.2d 1, 7 (S.D. 2004) ("However, newly discovered 
evidence is not a sufficient ground for habeas relief where no deprivation of a 
constitutionally protected right is involved."). 
 244. Appellate courts point to the district courts for prompt and decisive action against 
prosecutors who have defaced justice and encourage the district court to use its 
admonishment and contempt powers to salvage the integrity of the judicial system.  See
United States v. Modica, 663 F.2d 1173, 1186 (2d Cir. 1981) (affirming defendant’s 
conviction because the prosecutor’s improper summation did not deprive him of a fair trial 
since the evidence of guilt was overwhelming). 
 245. See Aviva Abramovsky, Traitors In Our Midst:  Attorneys Who Inform on Their 
Clients, 2 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 676, 676 (2000) (describing prosecutors’ use of defense 
attorneys as informants against their own clients). 
 246. See generally Judith A. Morrow, Jackie A. Gardina & Salvatore Ricciardone, 
Judicial Attitudes Toward Confronting Attorney Misconduct:  A View from Reported 
Decisions, 32 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1425 (2004) (analyzing judges’ attitudes and approaches 
towards their role in regulating attorney conduct) [hereinafter Judicial Attitudes]. 
 247. See Rory K. Little, Who Should Regulate the Ethics of Federal Prosecutors, 65 
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The idea of assessing financial penalties against this political248 titan 
causes district courts to create justifications for not doing so (i.e. the noble-
cause ideology).  Hence, absolute immunity and harmless error were 
created.  The courts later developed qualified immunity to address those 
prosecutors who pushed the envelope but did so while acting in an 
administrative function.  The courts herald qualified immunity as its 
response to the public’s outrage and call for justice.  Meanwhile, 
prosecutors stand on the sidelines calmly249 filing their fingernails, realizing 
that qualified immunity is immunity nonetheless.250
Let’s assume that a prosecutor was assigned to a murder case 
involving the death of a recently-elected city councilman.  A police report 
was generated and the lead detective located a suspect who may have been 
responsible.  Before the suspect was arrested, the prosecutor received 
information from the first deputy, indicating that he was going to be 
promoted to another division in the office.  While celebrating his 
promotion, the prosecutor, just minutes later, received a supplemental 
police report, stating that the potential suspect had an alibi that made it 
highly unlikely that he was the murderer.  The prosecutor gently placed the 
new report in the shredder,251 put on his jacket and threw the file on the 
desk of his successor as he left the building to celebrate his promotion.  The 
suspect is later arrested and convicted for murder.  He spends ten years in 
prison before learning of the supplemental report that was destroyed. 
If the defendant pursues a § 1983 action against the prosecutor who 
shredded the report, should the prosecutor’s actions be protected by 
                                                                                                                 
FORDHAM L. REV. 355, 360 (1996) (asserting that the United States Supreme Court has 
curtailed the court’s supervisory powers against offending prosecutors). 
 248. See Anthony S. Barkow & Beth George, Prosecuting Political Defendants, 44 GA.
L. REV. 953, 1008 ( 2010) [hereinafter Prosecuting Political Defendants] (offering a 
proposal to slightly narrow the scope of the U.S. Attorney’s Manual’s model to limit 
prosecutorial discretion). 
 249. A prosecutor was sanctioned with a three-month deferred sentence for failing to 
turn over exculpatory evidence to the defense regarding a witness’ inability to see the person 
who committed the crime because she did not have her eyeglasses on. See LA. CODE. CRIM.
PROC. ANN. arts. 718, 719(A), 722 (1977) (amended 1997) (granting a defendant access to 
any exculpatory evidence within the possession of the prosecutor, even if the prosecutor 
does not intend to use the evidence at trial); see also In Re Jordan, 913 So. 2d 775, 781 
(2005) (dismissing charges against a prosecutor for failing to disclose pertinent information 
from a witness to the defense). 
 250. See Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478, 496 (1991) (finding qualified immunity to be 
more protective than absolute immunity). 
 251. See Revisiting Disclosure, supra note 211, at 488 (noting that a conscientious 
prosecutor would dismiss charges against a defendant in the face of exculpatory evidence). 
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absolute or qualified immunity?  The Supreme Court’s decision in Van De 
Kamp seems to reflect that the decision to shred the documents was done in 
the context of a prosecutor, not as a supervisor.  However, a serious 
argument could be presented to show that the prosecutor’s promotion prior 
to learning of the supplemental report placed him in an administrative role; 
thereby putting him within the parameters of qualified immunity.252
Realistically, the prosecutor’s act of shredding valuable evidence in 
favor of the defendant would probably never be discovered. The defendant 
would spend the rest of his life in prison, and his entire existence on this 
earth would be reduced to an inmate number found on the left side of his 
orange jumper.253   Regardless of whether the courts implement absolute or 
qualified immunity against the offending prosecutor, the result would be the 
same because the courts’ primary objective is to protect the office, not the 
individual prosecutor.  With this in mind, the prosecutor in our example 
would still be able to deflect a civil suit no matter what standard the court 
instituted. 
PART III 
Addressing the Misconduct 
As already mentioned, qualified immunity is impenetrable and the 
Supreme Court has already guaranteed that no form of judicial or 
governmental oversight can be implemented to deter what prosecutors do 
best—obtain convictions.   The Supreme Court noted in Imbler254 that 
prosecutors are immunized from civil liability for acts intimately255
associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process.  By making this 
statement, the Supreme Court knew that it had just handed the nation’s 
prosecutors the keys to the kingdom.256
                                                                                                                 
 252. The Supreme Court declared that qualified immunity would bar suit against 
government officials whenever "their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory 
or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known." Harlow v. 
Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). 
 253. See Judicial Attitudes, supra note 246, at 1462 (noting that courts are primarily 
concerned with providing a fair, efficient and impartial forum for disputes). 
 254. See Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 424 25 (1976) (noting the inadequacy of 
qualified immunity for protecting prosecutors form suits). 
 255. See generally Hayes v. Parish of Orleans, 737 So. 2d 959 (La. Ct. App. 1999) 
(affirming the lower court’s decision that defendant prosecutor was immune from tort claims 
based upon the prosecutor’s prior prosecution of the plaintiff). 
 256. See generally Margaret Z. Johns, Reconsidering Absolute Prosecutorial Immunity,
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In Aversa v. United States,257 the petitioner sued the Assistant 
District Attorney for willfully and purposefully telling a local and 
national news media that the petitioner was involved in drug dealing 
and money laundering when the prosecutor knew that the money 
discovered in the petitioner’s bank accounts was obtained from a 
legitimate real estate venture.  The petitioner’s career as an 
accountant was ruined by the prosecutor’s public statements.  While 
the district and appellate courts characterized the prosecutor’s actions 
as false, misleading, self-serving, unjust, and unprofessional, it still 
refused to pierce the prosecutor’s protective coating because the 
prosecutor could not be held personally accountable due to qualified 
immunity. 
In Imbler, Justice White stated in his concurrence that the 
immunity which the majority sponsored for prosecutors was to 
guarantee that these ministers of justice remain zealous in their law 
enforcement responsibilities.  He went on to say that those who may 
be offended by the prosecutor’s behavior can have recourse against 
them in the criminal courts and in the Office of Professional 
Responsibility (OPR).258
Classifying qualified immunity as a lesser grade of immunity for 
a prosecutor is quite frankly a hoax.   Originally, qualified immunity 
was created as a mechanism to provide a quick resolution to claims of 
misconduct committed by government officials.  The crucial element 
necessary for any government official to possess this type of 
immunity was to be in good faith and without any malice—both of 
which are questions of fact.  If these issues can only be determined 
following a trial, then qualified immunity really is not immunity at 
all.
The United States Supreme Court’s discussion in Imbler is a 
circular style of logic that is synonymous with the classical musical 
chairs games or the urban card shuffle games of the 1970s.  Several 
federal circuit courts have shown their willingness to end this cycle 
                                                                                                                 
2005 BYU L. REV. 53 (2005) (arguing that absolute immunity for prosecutors should be 
abolished). 
 257. See Aversa v. United States, 99 F.3d 1200 (1st Cir. 1996) (affirming the dismissal 
of the plaintiff’s slander action against a U.S. Attorney since he was acting within the scope 
of his employment as a prosecutor). 
 258. See Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 429 (1976) ("This Court has never 
suggested that the policy considerations which compel civil immunity for certain 
governmental officials also place them beyond the reach of the criminal law."). 
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of abuse by finding that any prosecutorial decisions made with the 
specific intent to distort, fabricate, manipulate, or mislead (choose 
the adjective that best suits your tastes), should be held personally 
accountable. 
Generally speaking, prosecutors will not prosecute their own.259
Actually, there is a slim chance that these rogue prosecutors will ever 
be indicted.  For a prosecutor to be indicted for the manner in which 
he or she tried a felony case will affect office morale and cause huge 
turnovers in the department.260  Remember, the action that is being 
sued upon with prosecutors is that attorney’s failure to abide by the 
Constitution—an action that should never happen among those who 
portray themselves as ministers of justice.261
Judges, who are generally former prosecutors,262 view the act of 
disciplining other prosecutors as repulsive as mothers eating their 
own young.263  In addition, the OPR, which is in the best position to 
supervise and discipline federal prosecutors, usually administers its 
decisions in secret and enjoys the added bonus of no public 
oversight.264
Ephraim Unell advocated that absolute immunity should either 
be totally abolished or significantly limited so that these aggrieved 
defendants who have been incarcerated well over a quarter of their 
lives can receive some sort of financial recourse against prosecutors 
                                                                                                                 
 259. See Peter Krug, Prosecutorial Discretion and Its Limits, 50 AM. J. COMP. L. 643, 
654 (2002) (noting that prosecutors rarely face professional discipline for discretionary 
decisions). 
 260. See Joanna C. Schwartz, Myths and Mechanics of Deterrence:  The Role of 
Lawsuits in Law Enforcement Decision-Making, 57 UCLA L. REV. 1023, 1035 (2010) 
(describing the negative effects that the threat of civil rights damage actions can have on 
public offices). 
 261. See id. (discussing constitutional criminal procedure). 
 262. A former prosecutor was charged in a forty-seven-count indictment for falsifying 
evidence that resulted in two men being wrongfully convicted.  This former prosecutor was a 
presiding county judge at the time of his arrest.  See EX-PROSECUTORS CHARGED, supra note 
141, at 18. 
 263. One legal scholar described criminal judges as former prosecutors who often 
forget that they no longer should have an interest in getting the defendants convicted, and 
their behavior has been viewed as less tolerable than the actual prosecutors in the case. See
SEYMOUR WISHMAN, CONFESSIONS OF A CRIMINAL LAWYER 1–10 (1981) (reflecting on the 
various complications of his work as a criminal defense attorney). 
 264. See Bradley T. Tennis, Uniform Ethical Regulation of Federal Prosecutors, 120 
YALE L. J. 144, 180 (2010) ("Proceedings are conducted largely in secret, and the results are 
often unpublished, even within the Department of Justice itself."). 
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who only view convictions265 as a form of career advancement.266
This Author whole heartedly agrees with Unell that absolute 
immunity must be diluted in the wake of such an enormous amount 
of prosecutorial misconduct cases in our country.  Nevertheless, a 
more structured conversation regarding the government’s response to 
this growing epidemic must take place—immediately. 
PART IV 
The Proposal 
Every seasoned personal injury trial attorney that I have had the 
pleasure to meet and witness in a trial proceeding has the same motto:  
whenever a claimant intends to bring a lawsuit against an agency, 
department, or entity, they must establish a paper trail,267 which chronicles a 
pattern of negligent actions.  In doing so, the claimant establishes a history 
for the trier of fact which can advance his cause of action and sustain his 
lawsuit in court. 
The same ideology can be applied to prosecutorial misconduct cases, 
but the courts as well as disciplinary associations seem to be deathly afraid 
to approach this issue with any degree of candor.268  United States President 
Barak Obama, our nation’s 44th president, has made the concept of 
transparency269 the hallmark of his administration; thus, this Author 
                                                                                                                 
 265. See generally Ephraim Unell, A Right Not To Be Framed:  Preserving Civil 
Liability of Prosecutors in the Face of Absolute Immunity, 23 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 955 
(2010) (arguing for the abolition of absolute immunity for activities undertaken within the 
scope of a prosecutor’s duties). 
 266. See George T. Felkenes, The Prosecutor: A Look at Reality, 7 SW. U. L. REV. 98, 
112 (1975) (noting that young prosecutors may imitate their superiors’ emphasis on 
obtaining convictions in an effort to maintain career stability). 
 267. See Patrick J. Kelley & Laurel A. Wendt, What Judges Tell Juries About 
Negligence:  A Review of Pattern Jury Instructions, 77 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 587, 588 (2002) 
(examining how courts convey the negligence standard to the jury and how juries understand 
and apply those instructions to the facts of the case); see also Caroline Forell, Statutory 
Torts, Statutory Duty Actions, and Negligence Per Se:  What’s the Difference, 77 OR. L.
REV. 497, 497 (1998) (examining the interrelationship of statutes and tort actions). 
 268. See Kenneth Rosenthal, Prosecutor Misconduct, Convictions and Double 
Jeopardy: Case Studies in an Emerging Jurisprudence, 71 TEMP. L. REV. 887, 889 (1998) 
(noting a significant absence of disciplinary sanctions against prosecutors, even in egregious 
cases of misconduct). 
 269. See Peter Nicholas & Christi Parsons, The 44th President:  New Administration 
Gets to Work, LOS ANGELES TIMES, Jan. 22, 2009, at A1 (reporting on President Obama’s 
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believes  that transparency should also be the resounding theme when 
dealing with prosecutorial misconduct.270  The increased number of 
prosecutorial misconduct cases should spark the same intense form of 
public upheaval as the members of the Tea Party did regarding the issue of 
out-of-control government spending during the 2010 Congressional Mid-
Term elections.271
Accordingly, this Author proposes that Congress, through the 
leadership and direction of the United States President, create a five-
member committee, whose sole purpose would be to deal with the 
overwhelming amount272 of prosecutorial misconduct complaints that have 
been lodged in both our federal and state court systems.  The creation of 
this committee would be comprised of at least one Supreme Court Justice, 
the presiding United State Attorney General, the chairperson of the Senate 
Judiciary Committee, the United States Attorney who presides over the 
district where the misconduct occurred, and the chairperson of the 
American Bar Association.  Just as it is done with the Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission (EEOC),273 the United States President can 
                                                                                                                 
efforts to make his administration more transparent);  see also Sheryl Gay Stolberg, On First 
Day, Obama Quickly Sets a New Tone, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 22, 2009, at A1, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/22/us/politics/22obama.html (last visited Feb. 1, 2011) (on 
file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice)  (reporting that 
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 270. See generally Russell G. Pearce, Professional Responsibility for the Age of 
Obama, 22 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1595 (2009) (advocating the potential greatness that 
morally responsible lawyers can realize in their everyday work). 
 271. See Liz Robbins, et. al., Protesters Air Views on Government Spending at Tax Day 
Tea Parties Across United States, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 16, 2009, at A16, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/16/us/politics/16taxday.html (last visited Feb. 1, 2011) 
(reporting on Tea Party protests against large government spending) (on file with the 
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A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/19/us/politics/19russo.html (last visited 
Feb. 1, 2011) (reporting on Sal Russo’s efforts to advance Tea Party ideals) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice). 
 272. In the late 1980s, the EEOC amended its administrative procedures by developing 
and training private attorneys in Title VII actions to address its immense backlog of pending 
charges and to assist overburdened claimants with their litigation efforts. See Allen 
Greenberg, NAACP Sees Rising Job Discrimination Against Minorities, UPI, Jan. 12, 1988 
(quoting NAACP attorney James Foster that EEOC investigators are overwhelmed by a 
backlog of complaints). 
 273. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) was created as a 
mechanism to attack employment discrimination through conciliation and persuasion inside 
the guise of Title IV Civil Rights Act of 1964.  See Laurie M. Stegman, An Administrative 
Battle of the Forms:  The EEOC’s Intake Questionnaire and Charge of Discrimination, 91 
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appoint a general counsel to this committee, and anoint them with the 
authority to provide direction, coordination, and supervision to each 
member of the panel. 
Although these complaints can encompass state prosecutors, this 
Author argues that all complaints be filed with this committee.  This 
committee would have original authority over all prosecutorial misconduct 
complaints, and it would designate the specific format for all written 
complaints as well as issue a written opinion to the aggrieved defendant—
all of which is similar to the "right to sue" letters issued by the EEOC274 in 
employment discrimination suits.275  Committee opinions would be posted 
on either its own website or on the website for the American Bar 
Association.  In those instances where a defendant was convicted through 
the prosecutor’s deceptive, unethical, and unconstitutional trial tactics 
during either the investigative or guilt phase of a criminal proceeding, the 
aggrieved defendant can file a claim before this committee, outlining 
his/her entitlement to file a § 1983 action against the individual prosecutor 
responsible for their wrongful conviction.276
The complainants who are successful in receiving a "right to sue" letter 
from this committee can file their lawsuit in federal court and litigate their 
causes of action before a trier of fact.  The complainants would have their 
complaints summarily dismissed, but can find solace in the fact that a 
                                                                                                                 
MICH. L. REV. 124, 124 (1992) [hereinafter Administrative Battle] (chronicling the creation 
of the EEOC as a mechanism to seek compliance with the Civil Rights Act of 1964). 
 274. As it relates to the EEOC, "if the Commission determines after such investigation 
that there is reasonable cause to believe that the charge is true, the Commission shall 
endeavor to eliminate any such alleged unlawful employment practice by informal methods 
of conference, conciliation and persuasion." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (2010). 
 275. Actually, the EEOC has a two-step filing process embodied in a pair of forms:  the 
Intake Questionnaire, which solicits preliminary information (i.e. name, address, brief 
description of the discriminatory act complained of and the employer), and the Charge of 
Discrimination, which formally engages the EEOC’s administrative machinery.  See EEOC 
Form 283; see also Administrative Battle, supra note 215, at 126 (describing the EEOC’s 
two-step filing procedure). 
 276. A New York State Supreme Court justice ordered the release of a man who spent 
eighteen (18) years in prison for a crime he did not commit.  The release of Fernando 
Bermudez was ordered because the court had sufficient evidence to establish that 
Bermundez was "actually innocent" of the crime he was sent to prison.  The actual 
innocence analysis permitted the courts to avoid procedural roadblocks in the criminal 
process when there was compelling evidence of innocence.  John Eligon, Hope for the 
Wrongfully Convicted, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 23, 2009, at A23, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/11/23/nyregion/23innocence.html (last visited Feb. 1, 2011) 
(quoting Glenn A. Garber, founder of the Exoneration Initiative, an organization that focuses 
on innocence claims that lack DNA evidence) (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal 
of Civil Rights and Social Justice). 
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national register would be generated due to their  petition being filed and 
that their complaints would be on that attorney’s record, indicating to the 
public that this  prosecutor had engaged in suspected unconstitutional 
behavior while in the prosecutor’s office. 
Just as the EEOC is a federally-funded agency that was created to 
enforce federal laws prohibiting employment discrimination in the 
workplace, the oversight committee would also be federally funded and 
endowed with the responsibility of insuring that justice and constitutional 
fairness is served by every government attorney in every criminal 
proceeding in this country. 
Undeniably, my argument for such a committee will be met with an 
unyielding amount of criticism and judicial scrutiny.277  Yet, it would be a 
true injustice for us to  continue to broadcast to the public that the United 
States Attorney’s office and the numerous district attorney offices across 
this country are serious about obtaining justice for the victims of crimes 
while maintaining a business as usual demeanor in court.  Promoting an 
agenda that says prosecutorial misconduct will not be tolerated should also 
come with zero tolerance for prosecutorial excuses, indiscretions, grave 
misjudgments, and unethical behavior.278
CONCLUSION 
There is no dispute that criminals deserve to be convicted and punished for 
the crimes they have committed whether it be misdemeanor offenses or crimes of 
a heinous and violent nature.  This Author asserts that the courts should always 
be blind to a defendant’s racial and socio-economic backgrounds while ruling on 
a case on its docket.  Unfortunately, the persons whom we have entrusted to 
guard justice and to protect her purity have been raping and molesting her 
innocence at will and with the blessings of the federal government. 
These ministers of justice have repeatedly been caught in the act of 
subverting justice; yet, they go unpunished.  They proclaim to the viewing public 
that their actions could not possibly constitute rape because they had the audacity 
to wear jurisprudential condoms called absolute immunity.  Legal scholars have 
warned the judiciary that giving these prosecutors the keys to the proverbial hen 
                                                                                                                 
 277. See Prosecuting Political Defendants, supra note 248, at 979 (noting that the 
decision to drop the Stevens prosecution gave rise to a large amount of criticism). 
 278. See Steve Weinberg, Cross-Examination:  Local Prosecutors Are the Last Sacred 
Cow in Journalism., QUILL, Jan. 1, 2004, at 12 (examining journalists’ efforts to investigate 
and report on prosecutorial misconduct). 
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house would only end in chaos, but their warnings were overpowered by the 
courts’ need to protect the institution. 
The harm these rogue prosecutors have caused to the image of justice 
indisputably outweighs any argument the federal judiciary can offer to protect its 
favorite son.  When these prosecutors are finally reprimanded for their actions, 
the only form of punishment they suffer is a lowering of their precious win-loss
ratios and perhaps a minor setback to their promotions. 279
The rationale behind assessing financial sanctions against prosecutors for 
their misconduct is gaining stronger public support.  But before the courts order 
prosecutors to take out their checkbooks, the federal government ought to 
establish an oversight committee to handle the large number of prosecutorial 
misconduct cases that have flooded the justice system.  The committee should 
also maintain a record of these offending prosecutors as well as the districts 
where these complaints have surfaced. 
Both the offending prosecutor and his respective supervisor will be required 
to submit a response to each and every claim listed in the petitioner’s complaint.  
To differentiate itself from the typical disciplinary boards across the country, the 
committee will place each complaint on its website as well as the committee’s 
decisions.  Anyone interested in reviewing a particular prosecutor’s disciplinary 
record will be able to research this information by using the prosecutor’s name, 
state where they are licensed, and their respective attorney number.  The 
committee’s investigative and decision–making authority will parallel that of the 
EEOC. 
As it relates to the EEOC, the members of the commission will be 
appointed by the United States President and all of the panel meetings will be 
transcribed and available to the public.280  Likewise, the oversight committee that 
I am proposing should also be vested with the same authority as the EEOC, 
except in the realm of prosecutorial misconduct complaints.  This committee (or 
commission) will have original authority over all prosecutorial complaints and 
the complaints must present sufficient information for the committee to approve 
the complainant’s right to pursue their cause of action in a court of law.  By 
establishing this committee, we can then begin the process of protecting the 
interests and innocence of our most prized citizen—justice. 
                                                                                                                 
 279. See Prosecutorial Subordination of Perjury, supra note 17, at 260 (examining the 
pros and cons of sanctioning prosecutors who suborn perjury). 
 280. See Joe Palazzolo & Mike Scarcella, Losing Integrity:  How Justice Fumbled Its 
Case Against Ted Stevens, LEGAL TIMES, Apr. 6, 2009, at 1 (noting a desire to regain public 
confidence in the wake of the Stevens prosecution). 

